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Abstract 
 
Title: Is there sufficient guidance to detect and obtain a conviction for  
occupational fraud in Ireland? 
 
Author: Carmel Buttimer FCA, BBS 
 
There has been an increased focus in the Irish media on fraud, particularly since 
the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank in 2007. There has however been little academic 
research undertaken into occupational fraud in Ireland. This study will examine 
whether or not the current guidance to detect and convict occupational fraud in 
Ireland is sufficient.  
 
This study achieves its objective by examining the content of press articles 
reporting thirty-five occupational fraud cases convicted in Ireland in the period 
2002 to 2013. It categorises the content of the articles using a framework 
developed by Cohen et al. (2010), which combines the Fraud Triangle (FT) with 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). It then uses qualitative and quantitative 
analysis to determine if these aspects of fraud are present in the relevant auditing 
standard (ISA 240: The auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of 
financial statements).  
 
This study found ISA 240 sufficient in its coverage of the ‘opportunity’ to commit 
fraud, but insufficient in its coverage of the ‘incentive/pressure’ and 
‘attitude/rationalisation’ elements to commit fraud. It suggests the addition of 
lavish lifestyle, greed, pressure from criminals, depression, concern for others 
and paying back for previous fraud to the examples of ‘incentive/pressure’ in the 
audit standard. It suggests the addition of sense of entitlement, no apparent 
regard for the crime, complicity in undertaking a fraud, weak personality, lack of 
business knowledge, looking out for the good of the company, charitable actions 
for the good of others and paying back for previous frauds to the examples of 
‘attitude/rationalisation’ in the audit standard. Undeniably, it would be 
impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all circumstances under which fraud is 
undertaken; however by including the examples of frauds compiled in this study, 
further guidance can be provided to auditors. 
 
The inadequacy of the auditing standard is not the only reason why the number of 
convictions for occupational fraud is low. This study finds the multifarious 
methods of committing fraud, the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting 
fraud, advances in technology, law and auditing standards not keeping pace, 
reluctance by organisations to report fraud, and the fact that predatory fraudsters 
target organisations and therefore not all frauds are accidental, as factors 
keeping the conviction rate for occupational fraud so low in Ireland. 
 
It is important that the professional standards and the resources of those charged 
with detecting and prosecuting fraud in Ireland be strengthened to give further 
confidence in the prevention, detection, and conviction of fraud. This should lead 
to a reduction in the effects of fraud in organisations and in wider society. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to this Research Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces this research by providing a background to the study and 
demonstrating how, using a review of extant literature, the researcher identified a 
gap in the literature. This chapter describes the research objective and the 
questions posed to fulfil this objective. It acknowledges the limitations of the 
research. This chapter closes with the provision of the structure of the dissertation.  
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
Recently there has been an increased focus on examining corporate fraud, due 
mainly to major financial scandals such as the collapse of Enron, Tyco and 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC in the US and Diageo Plc. and 
BAE in the UK. In Ireland, the Fyffe’s and DCC case, Greencore and the collapse 
of Anglo Irish Bank have been extensively reported on in the press. PwC (2014) 
reported that over 26% of the companies in Ireland were victims of economic 
crime, which includes fraud. The CSO (2014) indicated that there were over five 
thousand “fraud, deception and related crimes” documented in the first quarter of 
2014 in Ireland. These high profile cases have affected many stakeholders 
including shareholders, creditors and the wider society, and as a consequence 
public confidence in financial systems has been negatively affected (Pan et al., 
2011).  
 
When fraud is uncovered, auditors are often castigated for not warning about the 
financial position of the companies or for failing to detect the frauds which led to 
collapse of the organisation (Dennis, 2010; Gold et al., 2012). However the 
relevant auditing standard in Ireland, ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibility to 
Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements (2004), highlights that it is the 
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management of the organisation that is primarily responsible for detecting fraud 
and that the auditors are responsible for reassuring that the accounts present a true 
and fair view. It states that: 
 
 “the primary responsibility for the prevention and detection 
of fraud rests with those charged with governance of the 
entity and management” (ISA 240, 2004, p. 157).  
 
The auditor is:  
 
“responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements taken as a whole are free from material 
misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error” (ISA 240, 
p.158) 
 
The difference between actual and expected performance of the auditor is referred 
to in the literature as the “audit expectation gap” (Liggio, 1974; Dennis, 2010). 
Auditors utilise and rely on the auditing standards to guide their approach to their 
audits. It is therefore imperative that auditing standards are comprehensive and 
relevant to encompass as many possible situations that the auditors may 
encounter. 
 
1.3 Gaps in the Literature 
 
The three themes examined in fraud research since the 1940s are the factors, 
motivations and antecedents of fraud, the auditors’ role in fraud detection and 
prevention, and the impact of advances in Information Technology (IT) on fraud 
(Pan et al., 2011).  Cooper and Dacin (2013) reviewed available research of fraud, 
concluding that the areas which should be emphasised are fraud in the context of 
not only the individual, but where it takes place, that is the firm, the industry and 
society in general. Hogan et al. (2008) and Trompeter et al. (2013) identified the 
dearth of research into methods to assist auditors detect fraud beyond “red-flags”. 
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Cressey (1950, 1953) developed the Fraud Triangle (FT), upon which much of the 
work undertaken in fraud prevention and detection is predicated (Comer, 1998; 
Skousen et al., 2009). The FT states that three elements, namely pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalisation, must exist for a fraud to take place. The 
individual elements of the fraud triangle have been studied extensively with 
expansions on emphasis and examples suggested. For example pressure has been 
expanded to include non-financial and external expectations (Koh et al., 2008; 
Perol and Lougee, 2011), opportunity has been divided into preventative, 
detective and corrective (Coenen, 2008) and rationalisation was expanded to 
consider the personal integrity of managers (Hernández and Groot, 2007).  
 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1974; Beck and 
Ajzen, 1991) has been utilised to explain the intentions underlying dishonest 
actions in a number of different setting and industries. Cohen et al. (2010) 
combined the FT with the TPB to construct a framework which they call the 
FT/TPB framework. Employing this framework, they examined evidence from the 
press reports of thirty-nine cases between 1992 and 2005 in the United States to 
highlight the behavioural traits of fraudsters. Resulting from this research they 
recommend additions to the US auditing standards as some of their observed 
behaviours of fraudster were not included in the auditing guidelines. Cohen et al. 
(2010) called for the robustness of their findings to be investigated in different 
cultural and institutional contexts. 
  
“However, fraud is of course not limited to the U.S. and many 
countries have faced similar situations. It would be 
interesting to extend the scope of study to non-U.S. 
companies…. to investigate the robustness of our results in 
different cultural and institutional contexts” (Cohen et al., 
2010, p.289). 
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Trompeter et al. (2013) described Cohen et al.’s (2010) research as “novel and 
unique” (p. 293) and encouraged others to use this type of methodology in the 
future.  
  
Cohen et al. (2010) and Soltani (2014) drew attention to the importance of further 
analysis of European corporate fraud cases. Cohen et al.(2010) felt that manager’s 
“behaviour in fraud commitment has been relatively unexplored” (Cohen et al, 
2010, p. 271), noting that Europe had little research in this area. Soltani (2014) 
identified that the strong media coverage together with the size of the US financial 
markets is one of the determining factors in the extensive dialogue and 
investigation of corporate fraud in the United States as compared to Europe. In the 
case of European corporate failure cases “there are serious deficiencies” (Soltani, 
2014, p. 252) as far as academic publications and media coverage are concerned.  
 
This research answers these calls for research by examining the adequacy of the 
relevant auditing standard (ISA 240) to detect occupational fraud 1  in Ireland, 
utilising the FT/TPB framework. This study will analyse the content of the press 
reports of Irish occupational fraud cases to execute this exploratory, descriptive 
research objective in an Irish context. 
 
Furthermore there appears, from the scarcity of convictions for fraud, to be a huge 
difficulty, not only in detecting, but also in convicting for fraud in Ireland: 
 
“Ireland’s record in prosecuting significant white-collar crime is 
far from impressive. Despite the huge banking scandals over the 
years, only two people have gone to jail: John Ransack and the 
late Patrick Gallagher. Neither was prosecuted in this 
jurisdiction.” (Keena, 2010, p. 23) 
 
                                                 
1 Occupational fraud covers Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation 
(AM). These are also the categories of occupational fraud included in ISA 240 “The Auditors’ 
responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements” (2004). See Appendix A. 
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This has motivated the researcher to examine not only the adequacy of the 
auditing standard to detect fraud, but also to explore the other factors that may be 
deterring the conviction for fraud in Ireland. The combination of these factors led 
to the formation by the researcher of the research objective. 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
 
The objective of this study is to determine: 
 
Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for, 
occupational fraud in Ireland? 
 
This objective will be achieved by answering the following questions: 
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of 
extant occupational fraud in Ireland? 
 
2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland? 
 
1.5 Focus of this Research  
 
This dissertation will focus on cases of convicted occupational fraud in Ireland in 
the period January 2002 to December 2013 as reported in the press. The period 
chosen is post the introduction of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) 
Act 2001 in Ireland. The definition of occupational fraud used in this research is 
that of abuse of a person’s position within an organisation for personal or 
corporate enrichment (Zahra et al, 2007; David, 2009; Wells, 2011; ACFE, 2012) 
through “misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or 
assets” (Wells J. T., 2011, p. 8). It will not include welfare fraud, insurance fraud, 
marine fraud, money laundering and counterfeiting and fraud against individuals 
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or frauds committed against organisations by persons unconnected to the 
organisation. 
 
The research will replicate the work of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context. 
The study undertaken by Cohen et al. (2010) is discussed on pages 7 and 8. This 
study will use a wider definition of fraud than that of Cohen et al. (2010). They 
only examined FFR and the definition they used of fraud as stated in SAS 99 is:  
 
“fraud is an intentional act that results in the material 
misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an 
audit” SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002, Para. 5) 
 
This dissertation reviews occupational fraud, consisting of FFR and AM in Ireland 
by comparing the content of the press reports to the content of ISA 240 “The 
auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements” 
(2004), as this is the relevant auditing standard which outlines to Irish auditors the 
recommended audit approach relating to fraud. Following on from the results of 
this research, the difficulties in bringing a conviction for fraud are then explored. 
 
1.6 Limitation of this Research 
 
This exploratory descriptive research, while narrowing the existing gap in the 
literature, has limitations. In fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters in 
Business (Research), this dissertation was the first major piece of academic 
research undertaken by the researcher. Along with experience, time was another 
limiting factor for the researcher. This resulted in the time framework stopping in 
December 2013. This research was undertaken by only one person, so unlike the 
Cohen et al. (2010) study, there was not another researcher verifying the coding 
of the categorisation of the fraudulent activities. However, every effort was made 
to ensure the coding was accurate. 
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1.7 Structure of the Study 
  
Chapters Two and Three of this study provide a thorough analysis of the extant 
literature relevant to this research. Chapter Two synthesises the literature on the 
definitions and characteristics of fraud. The main writers cited in this chapter are 
Sutherland (1940, 1944) and Cressey (1950, 1953) as well as Brennan and 
Hennessy (2001), Albrecht et al. (2004), Zahra et al. (2007), Gullkvist and Jokipii 
(2013) and Dorminey et al. (2010). This chapter also reviews ISA 240 (2004) and 
the fraud red-flags included there-in. This is the relevant auditing standard in 
Ireland. The outcome of this chapter is to confirm the difficulties in defining fraud 
and convicting for fraud that will be re-examined in an Irish context to answer one 
of the questions posed in this study.  
 
Chapter Three introduces the framework used in this study by following the 
development of fraud theories from the 1950s. The main writers are Cressey 
(1950, 1953), Ramamoorti (2008) and Dorminey et al. (2012) and ultimately 
Cohen et al. (2010). It looks at the creation of the Fraud Triangle (FT), the 
expansion, and elaboration of each of its elements, and the development of the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). It concludes with the development of the 
FT/TPB framework, by Cohen et al. (2010) which is a combination of the FT and 
the TPB. This is the framework that will be used in this study.  
 
Chapter Four describes the research strategy chosen to achieve the research 
objective. It justifies the use of content analysis of press articles and lays out in 
detail the steps taken by the researcher in extracting and analysing the content of 
the press articles of thirty-five unique cases of occupational fraud in Ireland, 
which are further analysed in Chapters Five and Six.  
Chapter Five verifies the validity of the FT/TPB framework for this study. It 
classifies the content of the reports of the thirty-five Irish occupational fraud cases 
convicted in Ireland between 2002 and 2013. Verification is achieved by 
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classifying the data first into the three elements of the FT; incentive/pressure, 
opportunity and attitude/rationalisation elements of the FT and then sub-
classification of the rationalisation element into the elements of the TPB; attitude 
towards risk, subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral 
obligation. The content of the press reports of the cases fits into this framework, 
deeming it valid for use in this study. 
 
In Chapter Six the elements of the thirty-five Irish cases, as classified by the 
FT/TPB framework, are compared to the examples in ISA 240, in order to 
determine whether these elements are present or not in the audit standard. This 
analysis will determine whether ISA 240 sufficiently covers the elements of fraud 
in the extant Irish cases or not. 
 
Chapter Seven presents the conclusion of this research by answering in detail the 
two research questions of this paper. It validates many of the findings of the 
extant literature in an Irish context and adds to this body of literature. It concludes 
with suggestions of how its findings could be used by other researchers to provide 
insight into occupational fraud. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the background to this research. It examined the need for 
research into occupational fraud in an Irish context. It stated the research 
objectives, research questions and the framework that will be used. It also outlined 
the limitations of the study. Chapter One concluded with an outline of the 
structure of the remainder of the study, from the literature review, research 
methodology, to the research undertaken, the findings, and the conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 Definition of Fraud  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter commences with an introduction to fraud, it then explores the 
definition of fraud, dividing extant literature into those publications that define 
fraud by its characteristics and those that define it by its constituent parts. The 
economic impact of fraud is examined and the criminal convictions for fraud are 
then explored. This chapter provides an analysis of, and the production of a figure 
depicting, the main reasons why it is difficult to bring a conviction for fraudulent 
activities. It concludes with a review of the controls to prevent fraud, in particular 
a description of ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an 
Audit of Financial Statements” and the red-flags included therein.  
 
2.2 Fraud is Not a New Crime 
 
Fraud is not a new crime (Zahra et al., 2007; Dearman, 2012; Dorminey et al., 
2012). It has “existed since the beginning of commerce” (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 
556). One of the first reported instances of public company fraud was in the East 
Indian Tea Company in the late 1600s (Smith, 1776; Keay, 1992; Robins, 2007). 
This public company abused the powerful position granted to it by the British 
government to grow the company and artificially inflate its share price. 
Parliamentary inquiries into the company exposed corruption and fraud and as a 
result the share price fell dramatically. Over four hundred years later, fraud is still 
prevalent in commerce. 
 
“Recently – over four centuries after the East Indian 
Company introduced the concept of public ownership – we 
have seen significant abuse in companies leading to large-
scale fraud, the bankruptcy of major companies and the 
evaporation of wealth” (Albrecht et al., 2004, p.110). 
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It is only since Sutherland (1940) coined the phrase ‘white-collar crime’, 
over seventy years ago, that it has been a topic of academic research. 
Sutherland (1940) researched “robber barons.” The robber barons were the 
owners and directors of the railroad companies of the late nineteenth century 
who completed railroads “in the complete absence of any high standard of 
commercial honesty” (Sutherland, 1940, p.2). This white-collar crime 
occurred due to lack of knowledge by the victim (the business) of the 
possibility of such a crime occurring.  
 
“The power of the white-collar criminals is the weakness of 
their victims. Consumers, investors, and stockholders are 
unorganized, lack technical knowledge, and cannot protect 
themselves” (Sutherland, 1940, p.9). 
 
The term white-collar crime is now synonymous with the full range of frauds 
committed by professionals.  
 
2.3 Definition of Fraud  
 
This section of the study first examines the literature which defines fraud by its 
characteristics and then the literature that defines fraud by the type of fraudulent 
activity undertaken. Even though fraud has been around since trading began, it 
was not until Sutherland (1940) distinguished fraud from other crimes such as 
burglary and theft, that the consideration of fraud has emerged (Dorminey et al., 
2010). Academics, however, have stressed the difficulty in defining fraud (for 
example Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; Coenen, 2008; Ramamoorti et al., 2009; 
Tickner, 2010; Power, 2012). Brennan and Hennessy (2001) state that  
 
“the word ‘fraud’ is commonly used to cover a multitude of 
offences which may differ markedly in size, varying from 
small (e.g. false expense claims) to very large (e.g. fictitious 
overseas subsidiary)” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 57). 
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Comer (1998) suggests that fraud can be classified by definition (e.g. fraud, theft, 
embezzlement), by victim (e.g. customers, creditors), by perpetrators (e.g. owners, 
managers), by frequency (e.g. once off or systematic), legally (e.g. crime, tort, 
contractual), by organisation (e.g. internal, external or transactional) and by the 
type of fraud (concealed or unconcealed). As there is no definitive definition of 
fraud, the characteristics and activities that constitute fraud will now be examined. 
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of Fraud 
 
At the heart of fraud are two main characteristics, namely the presence of 
deception and a resultant loss from that deception (Comer, 1998; Zahra et al., 
2007; Burns, 1998; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; Brown, 2010; Tickner, 2010; 
Dearman, 2012; Power, 2012). A relevant question is “at what point does sharp 
practice become fraud?” (Burns S. , 1998, p. 38). Judge Laddie in Bernasconi V 
Nicholas Bennett and Co (2000) answered this question, when he stated that it 
was the dishonesty factor which distinguished the act as fraud, rather than 
wrongful trading. The extant literature agrees that fraud is an act committed by a 
person or persons, in an abuse of power, causing a loss to, or dishonest advantage 
over, another (for example Comer, 1998; Coenen, 2008; Brennan and Hennessy, 
2001; Tickner, 2010; Hill, 2010; PwC, 2011).  
 
Zahra et al. (2007) asks if fraud is always a crime. To answer this they divided 
fraud into three categories: active, a crime of obedience, or a result of errors. An 
individual is an “active participant” in fraud if s/he organises the fraud. When an 
individual carries out an order and commits a fraud (rather than disobey an order 
and suffer the consequence of disobedience), this passive acquiescence is a crime 
of obedience. Finally, fraud can be a result of errors due to negligence. Even 
though all three situations result in fraud (inferring that committing an error is 
fraud), they are not necessarily crimes (Zahra et al., 2007).  
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Others believe that it is the extent of the individual’s participation in the fraud that 
determines whether or not a fraud took place. The key factor in determining 
whether an action is fraud or just an error is the intention of person or persons 
who commit the act of fraud (Terry, 1915; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; PwC, 
2011). In reviewing case law, Keay (2006) found that in measuring intent of a 
fraudster, judges “measured what the respondent did according to the standards 
of ordinary people” (Keay A. , 2006, p. 134) and that the “test for intent to 
defraud is subjective and not objective” (Keay A. , 2006, p. 125). Therefore a 
judgment needs to be made in each individual case of suspected fraud, as there is 
no specific test or measure to establish a person’s intent and it is the law that 
determines whether an action constitutes fraud (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; 
Brown, 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Activities that Constitutes Fraud 
 
Just as there is no conclusive definition of the characteristics of fraud, there is also 
no definitive list of what constitutes fraud. The number of offences that constitute 
fraud “are many and various” (Arlidge and Parry, 1985, p.3). Sutherland (1940) 
lists the offences perpetrated by people convicted of white-collar crime as 
misrepresentation in financial statements, bribery, embezzlement, short weights 
and measurements, tax fraud and misapplication of funds in receiverships. These 
offences, along with others, such as extortion, concealment of material facts and 
collusion (Coenen, 2008; Brown, 2010; Hill, 2010; Lloyd, 2010) are identified as 
types of fraud committed in professional literature and textbooks.  
 
In its blog, the FBI describes the fraud carried out in Enron, ultimately resulting in 
the collapse of this organisation and the demise of its auditors (Arthur Anderson) 
in 2002, as follows: 
 
“Top officials at the Houston-based company cheated 
investors and enriched themselves through complex 
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accounting gimmicks like overvaluing assets to boost cash 
flow and earnings statements, which made the company even 
more appealing to investors”  (FBI, 2011)  
 
Irish law does not have a crime named “fraud.” Instead, it refers to the concepts of 
fraud and a notion of what it means to defraud someone (Criminal Justice (Theft 
and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001). The specific type 
of offences listed in the legislation include making gains or causing loss by 
deception, obtaining services by deception, unlawful use of a computer, false 
accounting, suppression of documents, forgery and counterfeiting.  
 
The issue in determining activities that constitute fraud is that: 
 
“there is no standardisation on the categories or classification 
of fraud. Different reporting bodies use different categories for 
types of fraud.” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 69).  
 
Therefore, there is no absolute definition of fraud, no comprehensive list of 
characteristics or activities, which constitute fraud. The definition of occupational 
fraud that will be used in this research is when a person abuses his/her position 
within an organisation for personal or corporate enrichment through Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation (AM).  
 
2.4 Impact of Fraud 
 
Sutherland (1940) believed that the cost of white-collar crimes was “probably 
several times as great as the financial cost of all crimes” for an organisation 
(Sutherland, 1940, pp. 4-5). He cited the case of a grocery store manager who 
embezzled $600,000, which equated to six times the loss that the stores in that 
grocery store chain incurred from the five hundred burglaries and robberies that 
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same year. Just one such crime could cause a store to go into liquidation. Asset 
Misappropriation (AM) and Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) are major 
costs for many businesses (Bierstaker et al., 2006; Wells, 2011). Ramamoorti 
and Olsen (2007) confirmed that even a single fraud in an organisation could 
have:  
 
“such devastating financial consequences, including 
irreparable damage, that few companies survive the crisis 
unscathed.” (Ramamoorti and Olsen, 2007, p.54).  
 
Thomas and Gibson (2003) estimated that in the USA $4,500 per employee was 
lost due to on-the-job fraud. In 2010, the European edition of the Global Fraud 
Survey estimated that 5% of annual revenue is lost to fraud (ACFE, 2010). In the 
UK, members of CIFAS reported over two hundred and seventeen thousand 
cases of fraud in the United Kingdom in 2010; they warned that “fraud rates 
have surged in recent years” (CIFAS, 2011).  
 
In Ireland Finfacts (2006) estimated that economic crime costs €1,000 per 
employee. PwC (2014) in their “Economic Crime: A Persisting Threat in 
Ireland” report surveyed seventy-eight Irish Companies to determine the level of 
economic crime. Of the companies surveyed, 26% had been the victim of 
fraudulent activity, and 50% of those affected companies suffered losses over 
€75,000 in the previous year. The Gardai Recorded Crime Statistics 2007-2011 
(CSO, 2013) showed an increase of 10% in “fraud, deception and related 
offences” in the period 2010 to 2011 compared to those from 2007 to 2010. 
While the statistics from various research and sources allocate different values to 
the financial impact of fraud committed, it is clear that the financial implications 
of fraud are substantial. 
 
The current recession causes a major concern that crime, especially acquisitive 
crime, will increase (Gill, 2011). In 2009, the Chief Executive of CIFAS, the 
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UK’s fraud prevention service, stated “with Britain in recession, a significant rise 
in fraud is inevitable” (CIFAS, 2009). However Gill (2011), who interviewed 
fraudsters about their views on the notion that the recession would cause an 
increase in fraud, concluded that the increase is more than likely related to more 
discoveries of fraud, rather than an increase in the occurrence of fraud. Whether 
due to the recession or not, fraud appears to be on the increase. 
 
The significance of the monetary effects of fraud can have a momentously 
negative impact on the results of an organisation, such as shareholders wealth 
being undermined, employees losing jobs, local communities suffering due to job 
losses. Fraud can also have far-reaching effects on society in general, with loss of 
public confidence in the organisation, as well as leading to substantial negative 
personal consequences for the executives involved (Rezaee, 2005) and often small 
businesses suffer disproportionately from losses due to fraud (Glodstein, 2009).  
 
2.5 Criminal Convictions for Fraud 
 
Even if a fraud is uncovered, research has shown that approximately 87% of those 
committing occupational fraud have never been charged with an offence and 85% 
have never been punished or employment terminated by an employer for fraud-
related misconduct (ACFE, 2012). In Ireland the number of reported instances of 
fraud vastly exceeds the number of convictions for this offence. The number of 
reported instances of “fraud, deception and other offences” in 2013 was over five 
thousand (CSO, 2014). These crime statistics cover all fraudulent crime including 
welfare fraud, Ponzi schemes, identity theft, bankcard fraud, as well as 
occupational fraud. However, the Irish Prison Services Annual Report (Irish 
Prison Service, 2013) shows that there were less than four hundred people 
committed to prison during 2013 for the category of “fraud, deception and other 
offences.” On the 30th November 2013, a snap shot of the prison population 
showed forty-seven prisoners categorised as serving a sentence for this category 
of crimes. These prisoners account for 1% of the prison population at that date. 
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Thirty six per cent of these prisoners were serving a sentence of less than one 
year, with only 9% serving a sentence of more than 5 years.  
 
The conviction figures are low given the number of organisations affected by 
fraud as per the 2014 PwC survey. Along with the apparent small number of 
convictions for fraud, it is estimated that 40% to 50% of organisations recover 
none of their fraud related losses (ACFE, 2012).  
 
The impact of white-collar crime, as already discussed, is far-reaching in terms of 
number of organisations affected and the value of the crimes themselves, yet the 
number of convictions for these crimes, from the statistics available, appears to be 
low. Therefore, the fraudsters do not appear to be making restitution for their 
crimes, either by repaying the organisations or by receiving custodial sanctions. 
The possible reasons for the difficulties in procuring a conviction for fraud will 
now be examined. 
 
2.6 Difficulty in Convicting for Fraud 
 
With the complexity of defining fraud, it is little wonder that there is great 
difficulty proving and subsequently obtaining successful convictions for fraud.  
 
“It has not always been possible to obtain a successful 
prosecution, reflecting the difficulty in proving the elements of 
the crime, including deception, obtaining advantage or the 
causing of loss.” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 82). 
 
Professionals are slow to take responsibility for identifying or convicting 
fraudsters (Power, 2012). Cited reasons for problems in convicting for fraud are 
the multifarious definitions of fraud, the difficulty in detecting fraud, the status of 
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the fraudster, difficulty in detecting fraud, advances in technology, law and 
auditing standards not keeping pace and organisations not proceeding with 
prosecutions against the fraudsters. These difficulties will now be discussed and 
expanded further below. 
 
2.6.1 Multifarious Definitions of Fraud 
 
As already discussed, one of the possible reasons for difficulty in gaining a fraud 
conviction is the wide range of offences covered under the umbrella of fraud and 
the complexity of the definition of fraud. 
 
“No one minds a straightforward theft, where it is clear what 
has been stolen and who has lost it, even if you don’t 
immediately know who took the cash, asset, or other item that 
has been stolen. Fraud is usually more complex and most 
people would prefer it was someone else’s problem.” (Tickner, 
2010, p.5) 
 
Even when reporting on an investigation in an organisation, accountants avoid the 
use of the terms ‘fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ as this “might imply fraudulent behaviour” 
by a person, and “could be construed as libellous” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, 
p. 82). The number of possible activities and the degree to which an individual is 
involved in those activities make it difficult to define an action as fraud. 
 
2.6.2 Status of the Fraudster 
 
Up to the 1940s, criminologists and sociologists had only focused on street and 
violent criminals (Dorminey et al, 2012). Sutherland (1940, 1944) noted that these 
prior theories tended to use poverty as a primary reason for crime, whereas he 
found that crimes perpetrated by management were rarely driven by poverty, but 
by strong financial incentives. Some found that these crimes were performed by 
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well-respected members of society in trusted positions in business (Sutherland, 
1940; Zahra et al., 2007; Ramamoorti, 2008).  
 
Rezaee (2002, 2005) stated that the majority of top financial statement frauds  
 
“occur with the participation and encouragement, approval, 
and knowledge of top management,” (Rezaee, 2005, p.280) 
 
KPMG, in their report “Who is a Typical Fraudster” (KPMG, 2011), identified the 
‘typical’ fraudster to be male, 36-45 years old, holding a senior management 
position in a finance or finance related function, who has been employed by the 
company for more than ten years and may work in collusion with another 
perpetrator. Holtfreter (2005) found that individuals undertaking fraudulent 
financial statements conformed to the high status, educated, male, image of white-
collar criminals. She found however that those who perpetrated asset 
misappropriation or corruption were more likely to be younger and could be either 
female or male and were less well educated. This supported the findings of Daly 
(1989) who also found that lower level male and female workers, who do not fit 
the profile of the typical fraudster mainly, carry out lower value fraud. 
 
White-collar criminals, sometimes called “gentlemen” criminals, were thought of 
as non-violent criminals (Sutherland 1950; Zahra et al., 2007), but recent research 
has shown that white-collar crime can also be violent showing the same criminal 
deviancy as street level criminals. This is especially the case when the criminals 
are confronted with their crime – especially when they are reoffenders (Walters 
and Geyer, 2004; Perri, 2011). Following on from his study of a number of fraud 
cases Perri (2011) stated that white-collar criminals can even “resort to murder to 
prevent their schemes from being detected and disclosed” (Perri, 2011, p. 236).  
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When fraudsters occupy a position of authority they can actively discourage the 
investigation of a suspected fraud by virtue of their status in the organisation 
(Brown, 2010; Tickner, 2010). Where the convictions are pursued, the penalties 
applied to fraudulent offences are often civil rather than criminal in nature 
(Sutherland, 1940; Taylor, 2011; Brown, 2010), as other members of society are 
fearful of antagonizing these professionals. Schoepfer et al. (2007) found that 
public perception however is that white-collar criminals should be punished 
equally as harshly as street criminals. 
  
Therefore the position of the fraudster, generally a person in authority who is 
aware of the workings of the business, and the perception that fraudsters are non-
violent, leads to an aversion to reporting of white-collar crime.  
 
2.6.3 Difficulty in Detecting Fraud  
 
If the fraudster is in a position of authority and has a superior technical knowledge 
of the workings of a business, it is difficult to identify complex fraud (Brown, 
2010; Tickner, 2010). Due to the secretive nature of the crime of fraud, and 
subsequent concealment of the act by the fraudster, which involves destroying 
evidence and disrupting the audit process, this makes detection and subsequent 
prosecution of fraud difficult (Ramamoorti, 2008; Tickner, 2010; Chitty and 
McCarthy, 2012). Zahra et al. (2007) also noted that much of fraud is uncovered 
accidentally, and that even when uncovered much goes unreported.  
 
“By nature, frauds are designed to be concealed from 
outsiders. Thus identification of a fraud can be costly and the 
outcome highly uncertain at the beginning of an 
investigation.” (Miller, 2006, p. 1010)  
 
Even if the action is an error, this does not mean that it is not a criminal offence 
(Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001). When investigating 
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cases of fraud, accountants, auditors and forensic accountants can assist in 
detecting fraudulent activity, but it is only the courts that can make a legal 
determination as to whether fraud has occurred (Arlidge and Parry, 1985; Brennan 
and Hennessy, 2001; Auditing Practice Board, 2009). However for an 
organisation following a strategy of fraud detection, rather than prevention, could 
be impractical given the difficulties in detection (Wells J. T., 2004).  
 
2.6.4 Advances in Technology 
 
Nearly sixty years ago, Sheridan (1955) was under the impression that “the golden 
age of fraud” had passed, as he believed that “modern inventions” were “unkind to 
the fraud-doer” (Sheridan, 1955, p. 441). However, as many recent financial 
scandals unfold, it is apparent that fraud is continuing at large levels in modern 
times. In fact, the types of fraud committed have “grown in complexity and its 
creativity” (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 560). Instead of stopping the perpetration of 
fraud, advances in technology have changed the ways in which fraud occurs in 
business.  
 
“The face of fraud changes as technology changes but the 
basic offences remain the same” (Dearman, 2012, p.1) 
 
Cybercrime was not on the list of types of fraud experienced by the companies 
surveyed for the PwC’s Global Economic Crime Report published in 2009 (PwC, 
2009). However, in its Irish Economic Crime Report in 2011, cybercrime was 
reported by over 20% of the companies in Ireland and in Western Europe (PwC, 
2011). It is now recorded in the top two economic crimes experienced by 
companies, with more cases reported than accounting fraud or money laundering 
(PwC, 2011). In its survey, cybercrime was defined as a crime where computers 
or the internet play a “central role in the crime, and not an incidental one” (PwC, 
2011, p. 11). Safecard.ie, an Irish organisation established to raise awareness 
about the harmful effects of credit and debit card fraud, estimated that fraud losses 
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on credit and debit cards in 2009 in Ireland was €16.6 million with 64% of the 
frauds undertaken with the card not present (“CNP”). Where the CNP the stolen 
card data is used to purchase goods over the internet, which is subsequently resold 
by the thieves for cash. 
 
It should not be assumed that cybercrime relates solely to people external to an 
organisation. Haugen and Selin (1999) reported that 85 to 90% of Information 
Technology (IT) frauds in their study were committed by perpetrators internal to 
an organisation. Gill (2011) interviewed a fraud manager noting that technology 
appears to make staff “less diligent in their own fraud prevention efforts” (Gill, 
2011, p.207) and technology, due to its ability to collect such masses of data 
quickly “enables fraudsters to commit crimes on a much larger scale than before” 
(Gill, 2011, p.207). 
 
2.6.5 Laws and Auditing Standards Not Keeping Pace 
 
As a member of the European Union, the Irish auditing regulations must comply 
with the Directives of the European Commission, however the national legal 
system also affects the audit environment (Knechel et al, 2008). Despite the 
financial impact of fraud, criminal sanctions have not been well-developed 
(Ogren, 1973; Tomasic, 2011) making it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud. 
Fraud prevention professionals feel that the law and law enforcement had failed to 
keep pace with fraudsters (Gill, 2011). PwC (2011) noted that when a fraud is 
detected a robust investigation is necessary to support disciplinary and/or legal 
actions against the perpetrators. In Ireland, the last update to the law on fraud is 
the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001 and as shown in 
section 2.3.2 the list of activities that constitute fraud are ever expanding. ISA 240 
“The Auditors responsibility relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements” 
was published in 2004 and SAS 99 was published in the US in 2002. ISA 240 will 
be discussed further in section 2.8. 
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The laws on fraud have not been undated since 2001 and the auditing standards 
have not been updated since 2004 and they may not be keeping up-to-date with 
advances in fraud. The laws and auditing standards acknowledge the role of 
management in the protection of the assets of an organisation, but management 
may require assistance from auditors and other professionals in preventing and 
detecting fraud.  
 
2.6.6 Organisations Not Pursuing Cases of Fraud 
 
Despite the availability of criminal sanctions and auditing guidelines, the level of 
prosecutions in Ireland appears to be low. This seems to arise from a number of 
factors. Firstly organisations don’t pursue cases against the fraudsters.  The 
reasons for this vary from fear of bad publicity, the thought that internal 
punishment is deemed sufficient, private settlement reached with the fraudster and 
criminal action deemed too costly to pursue (ACFE, 2014). Secondly when fraud 
cases are pursued it does not appear to result in many prosecutions.  
 
In Ireland the Gardai, at the National Fraud Bureau training initiative 
announcement, have reported that they are under resourced and “struggling to 
keep apace of the number of offences being reported” (Brady, 2014). This lack of 
resources prompted senior counsel Remy Farrell to comment that  
 
“it was probably easier to get away with white-collar crime 
now that it have ever been in the history of the state.”  (Farrell, 
2014) 
 
These lack of resources were confounded in 2012 when two senior Gardai who 
were in charge of the National Fraud Bureau retired (Cusack, 2012). The Director 
of Corporate Enforcement only have the resources to hire two accountants to 
investigate criminal charges, and one who recently retired has not been replaced 
(Farrell, 2014). In Ireland that now means that 
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“It is not only the regulatory bodies which have had their 
capacity to investigate and prosecute white-collar offences 
systematically degraded over the last few years. The Garda 
Bureau of Fraud Investigations is now so under-resourced that 
they are in a position to consider in detail only a small 
proportion of the offences reported to them. Of those that they 
are able to consider, the resources only exist to pursue 
investigations in respect of an even smaller proportion still.” 
(Farrell, 2014) 
 
Wright (2006) called for fraud trials to be treated differently to other prosecutions 
that are tried by jury due to the technical nature of the evidence presented and the 
complexities of the evidence gathering and evidence given. She suggested that 
trial by professional tribunals may lead to an increase in fraud prosecutions. 
 
As the resources of those who are charged with prosecuting fraud are inadequate 
the number of cases of white-collar crimes pursued in Ireland will remain low.  
“Not only do we continue to tolerate what was euphemistically 
described as 'light-touch regulation' but the very machinery of 
hard regulatory enforcement has been gutted in recent years. 
Not only have things not improved, they have gotten worse. As 
long as that remains the case, we will live in a veritable golden 
age for hucksters and fraudsters of all sorts. White-collar 
crime is highly profitable and the chances of being hanged, 
drawn and quartered – publicly or otherwise – are so slight as 
to be insignificant. (Farrell, 2014) 
 
Organisations not reporting or pursuing cases of fraud and Gardai being under-
resourced in relation to the cases which are pursued, has led to the small number 
of reported prosecutions for fraud, compared to the number of reported instances. 
 
2.7 Controls to Prevent Fraud 
 
As the effects of fraud are significant, in order to protect the assets of the 
organisation, a company needs to implement controls. Deloitte (2008) pointed out 
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that an organisation’s workforce is both its greatest asset but also its “most critical 
vulnerability”. They suggest that “risk is a dynamic phenomenon interacting with 
potentially changing variables” (Deloitte, 2008, p.15). The equation that they 
developed to assess corporate risk of fraud is:  
 
Risk = ƒ(Vulnerability * Threat * Context * Asset Loss * Consequence) 
 
By using this formula an organisation should be able to determine the risk that 
each individual poses to the organisation, based on their vulnerability (the 
characteristics and behavioural patterns of an individual), their threat to the 
organisation (personal and professional pressures which impacts a person’s life or 
view of themselves as competent), the context in which they work (the part of the 
organisation), the assets to which they have access to (which could be 
compromised if an individual wittingly or unwittingly disclosed information on, 
or took action against) and the consequence of the compromising of the assets 
(which can sometimes be acceptable and sometimes catastrophic). Using this 
formula, an organisation can determine the amount of resources they should put 
into controls in different areas of the organisation, weighting resources towards 
the area where the most fiscal damage can be done. 
 
While Deloitte (2008) risk equation offers an insight into the risks a corporation is 
exposed to, it does not help to develop a plan to protect the organisation. The use 
of accounting controls, improving the ethical culture of an organisation and the 
proactive use of data analysis in an organisation are the most effective way to 
lessen the opportunity for fraud to occur in an organisation (Brown, 2010). Lloyd 
(2010) called these the control infrastructure of an organisation. Placing emphasis 
on robust internal controls, good corporate governance, and the organisational 
ethics would appear to be the best way for organisations to reduce the 
opportunities for fraudsters (Albrecht et al., 1984; Auditing Practice Board, 2009; 
Brown, 2010). The introduction of controls into an organisation is however 
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expensive as additional paperwork and personnel are required. An organisation 
should assess the susceptibility of assets to fraud and develop controls to protect 
them. Organisations will need to consider the cost of the controls versus the 
potential cost of fraud. 
 
2.8 ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in 
an Audit of Financial Statements  
 
Since a ruling in 1896, the role of an auditor has been described as a watchdog 
rather than a bloodhound (Comer, 1998; Jones, 2009). This means that the auditor 
is not expected to approach their job with suspicion or an expectation of 
wrongdoing on the part of clients or their employees and unless given evidence to 
indicate otherwise they should accept any documents presented to them in good 
faith. 
“Clearly, auditing has changed considerably since 1896, 
although the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection has 
remained a low priority” (Jones, 2009, p. 50). 
 
Concern by the regulatory and accounting bodies regarding the prevalence of 
fraud and the need for transparency of financial transactions led to the 
development of ISA 240 (Apostolou and Crumbley, 2008).  
 
The international auditing standard ISA 240 “The Auditors’ responsibilities 
relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements” (2004) outlines the 
responsibilities of auditors, and those charged with the governance of the 
organisations’ assets in relation to fraud. It  
 
“aims to have the auditor’s consideration of fraud seamlessly 
blended into the audit process” (Ramos, 2003).  
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It is the international equivalent of the US auditing standard SAS 99 
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” (2002). There are only 
minor differences between SAS 99 and ISA 240 (Coenen, 2008) and therefore any 
research into one of the standards can be applied to the other standard. 
 
The primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud still lies with 
the management and those charged with governance, whereas the auditors have 
secondary  responsibility in this regard (Arlidge and Parry, 1985; Comer, 1998; 
Jones, 2009). ISA 240 did not change the auditors duty to plan and perform an 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are 
free from material misstatement whether caused by error or fraud. However the 
standards now require auditors to have professional scepticism, a partner lead 
discussion of fraud assessment with all senior audit staff on an engagement, and 
use of management enquiries and analytics to identify potential areas for fraud 
(Casabona and Grego, 2003; Jones, 2009). An auditor should then use their 
“intuition, judgment and experience to look for patterns in the identified fraud 
risks” (Ramos, 2003, p. 30). When assessing risks, ISA 240 has added that the 
auditor should presume there is improper revenue recognition and if none is found 
then that should be documented. ISA 240 also requires an auditor to include the 
risk of management override of controls as an audit risk (Ramos, 2003). 
 
ISA 240 divides the fraud undertaken in organisations into Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation (AM). Sometimes FFR is considered 
management fraud and AR is considered employee fraud (Gullkvist and Jokipii, 
2013). Beasley et al. (1999) indicated that 90% of financial statement fraud 
involved the manipulation, alteration, and falsification of financial information 
with the balancing 10% involving asset misappropriation. 
 
ISA 240 has a list of examples of fraudulent behaviour, also known as red-flags. 
These are reproduced in Appendix A. The red-flag approach involves “the use of 
a checklist of fraud indicators” (Bierstaker et al., 2006, p. 521). Loebbecke et al., 
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(1989) investigated auditors’ perceived importance of single red-flags by dividing 
the red-flags into primary and secondary indicators. Their findings indicated the 
most important red-flags were “decision making dominated by a single person”, 
“poor profitability”  and “management placing undue emphasis on meeting 
earnings projections” (ISA 240). Gullkvist and Jokipii (2013) surveyed internal 
auditors, external auditors and economic crime investigators regarding the 
importance of red-flags in alerting these professionals to the risk of fraud. The 
participant groups ranked the red-flags in auditing standards in different order of 
importance, however they found unethical management behaviour, cover-up of a 
poor financial situation or illegal acts and a weak internal control environment to 
be important accross all three groups. 
 
Glodstein (2009) suggested focusing attention on the red-flags and educating 
auditors and managers to the realities of fraud would lead to auditors asking the 
right questions iincreasing prevention and detection of fraud. He also found 
auditors who focus too much on the end result of the audit, the audit report and 
the preparation of the financial statement, may miss some red-flags indicating 
fraudulent behaviour. Skousen et al. (2009) using the red-flags in SAS 99 found 
that fraud could be predicted in over 70% organisations where fraud was 
subsequently reported. However heavy reliance on the red-flag (checklist) 
approach in the auditing standard has been criticised (Kranacher and Stern, 2004). 
The limitiations of using the red-flags approach are that red-flags may not 
necessarily indicate fraud as they focus attention on particular cues, while other 
indicators of fraud may be ignored (Krambia-Kardis, 2002; Bierstaker et al., 
2006; Glodstein, 2009).  
 
For example unexplained discrepancies in the analysis of the financial data in a 
company’s accounts, comparing prior year results to the present results is a red-
flag (Comer, 1998; Dennis, 2010). Wright and Ashton (1989) found that such 
reviews signalled an indication of FFR, resulting in over half of the audit 
adjustments noted in their study. However non-financial measures, such as 
comparison of employee numbers to competitor or comparison of a firms 
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manufacturing capacity to actual production, are not included as red-flags in the 
auditing standard, and could also be used to “determine the reasonableness of 
their clients’ financial statements” (Brazel et al., 2009, p. 1138).  
The red-flags in ISA 240, as outlined in Appendix A, are useful for auditors but as 
indicated above, over reliance on these red-flags may lead to auditors missing 
fraudulent activities. This research on the other hand sets out to examine the 
adequacy of these red-flags. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the extant literature’s attempt to define fraud by its 
characteristics and its constituent parts. This review illustrates that there is no 
absolute definition or list of activities that constitute a fraud. This was just one of 
the reasons why it is so difficult to bring a conviction for fraud. Figure 7.1 shows 
the seven reasons cited in the literature for difficulty in bringing a fraud 
conviction. The reasons are the multifarious definitions of fraud, the status of the 
fraudster, the difficulties in detecting fraud, advances in technology, laws and 
auditing standards not keeping pace, organisations not pursuing cases of fraud and 
not all frauds are accidental, which will be discussed in the chapter 3. The extant 
literature relating to the controls an organisation can implement to safeguard the 
assets of an organisation were discussed and ISA 240 which outlines the role of 
auditors relating to the detection of fraud in an audit was discussed. The 
introduction of ISA 240 was to ensure the auditors consider fraud in an audit. The 
auditor is now expected to consider that all documentation presented to them may 
not be trustworthy. However the primary responsibility for the detection and 
prevention of fraud remains with the directors and management of an 
organisation. The red-flags included in ISA 240 were also discussed and were 
shown to be a useful tool for auditors in detecting fraudulent activity, however it 
was also shown than over reliance on red-flags can lead to auditors ignoring other 
indicators of fraud. The combination of the factors discussed in this chapter has 
resulted in only a small number of persons convicted of fraudulent activity held in 
Irish prisons at this time. 
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Chapter 3 Frameworks for Fraud Detection  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Among the reasons given in the previous chapter for the difficulty in convicting 
for fraud was the difficulty in detecting fraud. This chapter will examine the 
trajectory of the framework for detecting and examining fraud from the basic 
Fraud Triangle (FT) developed by Cressey (1950, 1953), together with 
developments of the elements of the FT by subsequent researchers. The chapter 
concludes with the combined Fraud Triangle and Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(FT/TPB) framework as used by Cohen et al. (2010). The FT/TPB framework will 
then be used in this study to answer the research questions posed. 
 
3.2 Fraud Triangle (1950) 
 
Sutherland (1940) coined the phrase “white-collar” criminals. Ten years later, his 
PhD student, Cressey produced a framework that lead to the development of the 
Fraud Triangle (FT). The FT is a framework used to detect and prevent fraud. 
Cressey (1950, 1953) interviewed white-collar criminals to determine why they 
had committed fraud. He aimed to identify the factors present when a “trust 
violation” occurs but are absent when there was none. To achieve this he 
interviewed inmates in the Illinois State Penitentiaries who met the broken trust 
criteria and found that the “trust violation could not be attributed to a single 
event” but only as a result “of a sequence of events, a process” (Cressey, 1950, p. 
742). The frauds in the study, and the methods used, were diverse. 
 
Cressey (1950, 1953) found three elements in all the frauds: perceived pressure (a 
non-shareable financial problem), opportunity (an opportunity to violate their 
trusted position), and rationalisation (the ability to justify the behaviour, so that in 
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their mind it does not represent criminal behaviour). Having these three elements 
distinguishes the action as a fraud, rather than an error. 
 
“Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive 
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-
shareable, having the knowledge and awareness that this 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position 
of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct 
in that situation verbalization which enable them to adjust 
their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their 
conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or 
property.” (Cressey, 1950, p.742). 
 
From the work of Cressey (1950, 1950) the fraud triangle (FT) reproduced in 
Figure 3.1 below was developed. It is an uncomplicated model capturing the three 
elements of pressures, opportunity, and rationalisation. The FT is still widely used 
today in the study, prevention, and detection of fraud (Comer, 1998; Brennan and 
Hennessy, 2001; Skousen, et al., 2009; Cohen, et al., 2010). 
 
“In a relatively simple and understandable model, Sutherland 
and Cressey were able to help anti-fraud professionals 
understand the motivations and actions of good people who 
make bad choices.” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 19). 
 
Subsequent studies of fraud cases support the existence of the three elements of 
the FT (Bell and Carcello, 2000; Albrecht et al., 2004; Rezaee, 2005; Choo and 
Tan, 2007). Albrecht et al. (2004) with their “Broken Trust Theory” conjectured 
that pressure to commit corporate fraud and opportunities presented lead 
executives to break their agency or stewardship relationship, and they 
subsequently rationalise their behaviour. Rezaee (2005) reviewed five fraud cases 
and found all three elements of the fraud triangle in the cases reviewed.  
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Figure 3.1 - Cressey's Fraud Triangle  
 
 Reproduced from Corporate Fraud (Brown, 2010)) 
 
Albrecht et al. (2006), using the FT, compared the elements of fraud to a fire, 
where the three elements heat (perceived pressure), fuel (perceived opportunity), 
and oxygen (rationalisation) need to exist, for a fire (fraud) to continue to burn. 
They called this framework the “Triangle of Fraud Action.” Accordingly, the 
removal of one element lets the fire die, thus if one of the elements of the fraud 
triangle is removed then the fraud will not occur. These elements could also be 
“what policemen and detectives have referred to as means, motives, and 
opportunity” (Ramamoorti, 2008, p.525). In Choo and Tan’s (2007) American 
Dream Theory, they used the three elements of the fraud triangle by using 
monetary and corporate success as the pressure, with corporate executive having 
the opportunities to break regulatory control, leading the executives to rationalize 
and justify their actions.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2006) reviewed the corporate bankruptcies in the US in 2002 and 
noted that six of the ten largest bankruptcies, prior to that research, had taken 
Pressure
Opportunity
The Fraud 
Triangle
Rationalisation
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place in 2002. They also noted that the majority of the bankruptcies in that year 
related to financial statement and/or CEO fraud. They called this “the perfect 
fraud storm” and they listed the nine elements that caused it. The elements of this 
perfect storm were executive incentives, unrealistic Wall Street expectations, large 
amounts of debt and greed. The good economy as a mask of many problems, 
selective interpretation of rule-based accounting standards and opportunistic 
behaviour of CPA firms, moral decay in society and educator failures. They also 
listed these elements using the FT elements of pressures, opportunities, and 
rationalisations.  
 
Thus, research undertaken has confirmed the appropriateness of the FT as a 
framework to evaluate frauds. The auditing professionals have used it as a basis 
for their work in relation to fraud detection and prevention. These auditing 
standards (SAS 99 and ISA 240) use the FT framework of incentive/pressure, 
opportunities and attitude/rationalisation, to outline examples of behaviours that 
might alert the auditor to fraudulent activity. 
 
“According to the AICPA, only one of these factors needs to be 
present in order for fraud to be committed. SAS9 requires the 
auditor to apply numerous new procedures aimed at 
examining the firm environment and to evaluate expansive 
amounts of new information in an effort to identify facts and 
circumstances that are indicative of the existence of pressures, 
opportunities, and/or rationalizations.” (Skousen et al., 2009, 
p. 56). 
  
Skousen et al. (2009) used the formula  
FRAUD = ƒ(Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization) 
and data from financial statements of quoted companies to test the effectiveness of 
the FT and SAS 99 in detecting and predicting financial statement fraud. They 
found that when using financial information for publicly quoted companies with 
this formula and the examples of fraudulent behaviours included in SAS 99, fraud 
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could have been predicted in over 70% of organisations where fraud was 
subsequently reported. 
 
The FT framework has been confirmed by the research. The three elements of the 
Fraud Triangle (pressures, opportunities, and rationalisation) will now be 
examined further.  
 
3.2.1 Perceived Pressure 
 
Cressey (1950, 1953) found that a perceived pressure from a non-shareable 
financial problem motivated the perpetration of fraud. “Wine, women and 
wagering” were the pressures outlined by Cressey (1950, p. 743). These original 
pressures could be classified as financial pressures, however subsequent research 
critiques this element of the FT which should contain non-financial factors as well 
as financial factors. Pressures can also be classified as internal and external. 
 
Financial pressures such as expectations to meet or beat analyst set targets (Koh et 
al., 2008; Perol and Lougee, 2011) or funding requirements (Bell and Carcello, 
2000; Lie, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2007) have led individuals to 
commit fraud. Perol and Lougee (2011) found that firms reporting frauds are more 
likely to have managed earnings in prior years and are more likely than non-fraud 
firms to have met or exceeded analyst forecasts. Companies trying to secure low-
cost external funding (Deehow et al., 1996) or new equity (Efendi et al., 2007) are 
tempted to manipulate and misstate financial statements and earnings to make the 
company appear more attractive to investors. Similarly, CEOs with substantial 
stock options were more likely to misstate financial statements (Efendi et al., 
2007), as their wealth is a function of the stock price. Further evidence of stock 
options providing an incentive to act fraudulently was provided by Lie (2005) 
who found verification that hundreds of firms intentionally backdated their stock 
options in order that those with options would gain financially. However, 
Erickson et al. (2006) found no relationship, in the firms they examined, between 
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equity incentives and the probability of the firm reporting fraudulent financial 
information. Indeed Armstrong et al. (2010) found that accounting irregularities 
occur less where CEOs have comparably larger levels of equity.  
 
Agnew (1992), in an examination of cultural imbalances in crime, developed the 
General Strain Theory, which suggests that a social environment where social 
standing based on materiality induces behaviour to achieve material success. In 
other words, when the value of an individual is based on their wealth, then the 
individual will attempt to achieve, by whatever means, the wealth to maintain or 
further their social standing. Paternoster and Mazerolle (1994) and Broidy (2001) 
used the General Strain Theory in the context of white-collar criminals to explain 
the causes of FFR, addressing the notion of pressure driven fraud. They found that 
pressure to meet expectations drove the subjects to commit a fraud.  
 
Non-financial pressures were not considered in the original FT research. However 
Ramamoorti et al. (2009) used behavioural economics and psychology to 
understand the motivation behind the act of fraud, and confirmed that non-
financial reasons can also be a pressure that precipitates a fraud. They argue that 
“fraud is a human act” (Ramamoorti et al., 2009, p. 21) and conclude that even if 
individuals are wealthy their social status can be sufficient motivation to commit a 
crime. Cases such as Madoff, Enron and Worldcom are examples where the 
convicted perpetrators were motivated by their ego and sense of entitlement.  
 
Langton and Piquero (2007) and Zahra et al. (2007) studied sociology literature to 
determine whether stress or strain created by economic and social circumstances 
and norms of material ambitions could explain an individual’s propensity to 
indulge in criminal or fraudulent acts. They found that such strains were 
positively correlated to securities violations. These findings suggest that those 
who committed securities violations were of high social standing in their present 
employment but appeared to have a fear of liability and unemployment strains. 
For example if an executive fears a loss of a job then there is more likelihood of a 
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fraud. The loss could happen from non-performance of such things as market 
expectation, therefore s/he is more likely to use whatever means necessary, 
including criminal violation, to meet occupational expectations, suggesting that 
personal as well as organisational pressures are a factor in fraud.  
 
A criticism of Cressey’s work is that all the non-shareable financial pressures are 
internal, in that they related personally to the fraudster (Zahra et al., 2007; 
Kassem and Higson, 2012) and are therefore difficult to identify. Zahra et al. 
(2007) suggested that pressure could be divided into internal (personal) and 
external (organisational/societal/industrial) pressures. Similarly Ramamoorti et al. 
(2009) concluded that not only can the individual (Bad Apple) be under pressure 
to achieve targets, but also the department (The Bad Bushel) or the organisation as 
a whole (The Bad Crop) could use goals as motivation for the committing of 
fraud. Therefore, along with the individual’s personal ethics, the ethical culture of 
the organisation is also critical in the likelihood of fraud being committed 
(Ramamoorti et al., 2009; PwC, 2011).  
 
In order to classify the types of pressures that are likely to occur, Kranacher et al. 
(2011) classified the perceived pressure element of fraud using the acronym 
M.I.C.E. (M = Money, I = Ideology, C = Coercion and E = Ego / Entitlement). 
The purpose of this framework was to assist investigators in identifying the 
motivation of the perpetrator. Money is an obvious motivation to commit fraud, 
whether it is to pay for personal debts or to gain a higher bonus by adjusting the 
financial profits of an organisation (Coenen, 2008; Kranacher et al., 2011). The 
non-shareable financial pressure described by Cressey (1950, 1953) did not cover 
financial pressures such as stock options, bonuses and monetary incentives as they 
were not as prevalent in the 1950s as they are today but the research undertaken 
since then has expanded these pressures significantly. Also, as discussed earlier, 
Cressey (1950, 1953), did not identify non-monetary motivations. The M.I.C.E. 
framework also includes ideology, coercion, and ego. Ideology might be a less 
frequent motivation for occupational fraud but examples such as tax evasion 
because taxes are unfair or unconstitutional or funnelling funds to finance 
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terrorism activities show that ideology can be a motivating reason. The 
perpetrators believe that they are achieving some greater good (Dorminey et al., 
2010; Kranacher et al., 2011). Coercion is where the individual is unwilling but 
pressurised into participation in the fraud scheme (Kranacher et al., 2011) and 
equates to the Bad Bushel and Bad Crop identified by Ramamoorti et al.(2009). 
Ego is where an individual believes that they are entitled to the money or the 
status that they get because of the fraud being committed (Ramamorti et al., 2009; 
Kranacher et al., 2011). 
 
Kassem and Higson (2012) drew up a comprehensive list of perceived pressures 
dividing them firstly between financial and non-financial pressures and then 
between personal, corporate/employment and external pressures. Examples of 
personal financial pressures were gambling addiction, sudden financial problems 
and paying for lifestyle. Examples of non-financial personal pressures were lack 
of personal discipline and greed. Examples of corporate/employment financial 
pressures included continuous compensation structure, management financial 
interest in the business and low salaries. Examples of corporate/employment non-
financial pressures were unfair treatment, fear of losing job and frustration with 
work or challenge to beat the system. Examples of external financial pressures 
were threats to business financial stability and market expectations. Examples of 
non-financial external pressures were ego, image, reputation or social pressure. 
This again extended the “pressure” component of the FT. 
 
The full list of the examples of pressures presented in ISA 240, as shown in 
Appendix A, includes such examples as “financial stability or profitability is 
threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions”(ISA 240, p.32) 
and “personal financial obligation” (ISA 240, p. 36). ISA 240 outlines that 
pressures may occur internally and may also arise from outside the organisation. 
 
The expansion of the “perceived pressure” element of Cressey’s (1950, 1953) 
fraud triangle is therefore not only personal non-shareable financial pressure as 
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originally suggested, but also encompasses non-financial pressures and wider 
organisational and societal pressures. No matter where the perceived pressure 
arises, whether it is financial or non-financial and whether it is internal or 
external, when investigation of fraud takes place, the pressure is a difficult 
element to identify, as it is usually internalised (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; 
Brown, 2010; Kranacher et al., 2011; Taylor, 2011).  
 
3.2.2 Perceived Opportunity 
 
The second element of Cressey (1950)’s fraud triangle is perceived opportunity. 
The opportunity to commit fraud leads to the fraudster circumventing any of the 
internal controls the organisation employs to safeguard its assets. This is the 
element of the triangle that the management of the organisation has control over 
and is visible to the auditors.  
“As part of their anti-fraud efforts, organisations attempt to 
anticipate what fraudsters might perceive and design an 
environment to minimize (subject to implementation costs) the 
potential for material misstatement.” (Trompeter et al., 2013, 
p. 296). 
 
Several studies review the effectiveness of internal control systems or corporate 
governance to determine whether they have an effect on the likelihood of fraud 
occurring. Albrecht et al. (1984) and Lloyd (2010) discussed the factors that 
increase the likelihood of fraud in organisations and concluded that having an 
effectual internal control structure contributes most to the minimisation of 
opportunities to commit fraud in an organisation. If a fraudster does not have the 
opening to commit fraud then they believed that no fraud could occur (Albrecht et 
al., 2004). Loebbecke et al. (1989) surveyed audit partners with experience of 
detecting financial fraud. They found that weak internal controls were the chief 
condition necessary for the committing of fraud. Unsurprisingly Caplan (1999) 
found that managers who wished to commit fraud prefer weak controls to enable 
them to carry out the fraud.  
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Rezaee (2002, 2005) developed the CRIME model an acronym of five factors 
which increase the likelihood of financial statement fraud; Cooks, Recipes, 
Incentives, Monitoring and End Results. The Cooks of the financial statement 
fraud are those who perpetrate it. He stated that the majority of top financial 
statement frauds “occur with the participation and encouragement, approval, and 
knowledge of top management” (Rezaee, 2005, p.280). The Recipes of financial 
statement fraud is the methodology used by the fraudster to carry out the fraud. 
The Incentives of financial statement fraud equates to the pressure corner of 
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle. Rezaee (2005) noted that incentives, which encourage 
top executives to inflate earnings to increase their compensation packages, give 
those executives the incentive to commit fraud. The fourth element is monitoring. 
The rules of the stock exchange monitor publicly quoted companies. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) recognises that responsible corporate governance is 
driven by the tone at the top, where high quality financial reporting and no 
tolerance for misstatement are accepted.  
 
Rezaee (2005) also found that strong audit committees overseeing the financial 
reporting process and the presence of adequate and effective internal controls and 
audit function was the most effective way to monitor organisations. Rezaee (2002) 
suggested that by reviewing internal controls, forensically reviewing the 
organisation’s records and by having vigilant corporate governance together with 
vigilant audit committees and giving power to management and boards of 
directors to enforce corporate objectives, organisations could minimise the 
opportunities for fraud. In order words an organisation needs to place great 
emphasis on the corporate governance in an organisation to minimise the risk of 
fraud occurring. Abbott et al. (2004) reviewed how the audit committee 
characteristics (independence, financial expertise and activity levels) affected the 
likelihood of financial statements being restated. They found that occurrence of 
the restatement of financial statements was negatively correlated to the activity 
level and independence of the audit committee. McMullen and Omer (1996) also 
found that firms with financial reporting issues were less likely to have audit 
committees consisting of independent members. Deehow et al. (1996) found that 
firms with less independent boards, or with the CEO as the firms’ founder, were 
39 
 
more likely to manipulate earnings and less likely to have an audit committee or 
shareholding held by external block holders. The implication being that owner-
managed businesses, without a non-partisan board, facilitate fraudulent activities. 
Efendi et al. (2007) found executives on boards already sued for fraud to be more 
likely to be sued multiple times for fraud. Based on their empirical evidence Zhao 
and Chen (2008) found that boards with staggered terms (in contrast to those 
whose board is elected for the entirety of a term) showed lower likelihood of 
financial statement fraud, lower levels of unexpected accruals and lower firm 
values, suggesting that boards with this structure have less incentive to increase 
firm value or manage earnings. Collins et al. (2009) found that where the CEO 
exercised greater control over the board, the prevalence of option backdating was 
higher.  
 
Coenen (2008) suggested dividing internal controls into preventative (stopping it 
from happening in the first place); detective (finding fraud as soon as possible 
after it happens) and corrective controls (remedy the fraud and prevent it 
happening in the future). From these research findings, the role of corporate 
governance and strong audit committees with autonomous members could lead to 
a reduction in the opportunity available to commit fraud. The control 
environment, which the fraudster exploits to commit the offence, is the observable 
and most preventable element of the FT from an organisational perspective. It is 
the area that companies and auditors can concentrate on in order to deter fraud, as 
it is where they have maximum control over the systems of the company.  
 
The full list of the examples of opportunities presented in ISA 240, as shown in 
Appendix A, includes such examples as “accounting and information systems that 
are not effective” (ISA 240, p188) and “inadequate controls over assets” (ISA 
240, p190). ISA 240 outlines the importance of safeguarding assets and reducing 
the opportunity to commit fraud. 
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The opportunities element of the FT is the most observable and it is the element 
that is under the control of those in charge of the safeguarding of assets. Measures 
such as independent boards, audit committees and effective preventative, detective 
and corrective internal control measures in an organisation could be implemented 
to ensure the protection of the assets of an organisation.  
 
3.2.3 Attitude/Rationalisation 
 
The third element of the FT is rationalisation. The fraudsters need to justify their 
actions to themselves and to others. Fraudsters justify fraud in their own minds 
thus making it morally acceptable to themselves to commit the crime (Cressey, 
1950; Coenen, 2008; Kieffer and Sloan III, 2009). The term ‘rationalisation’ is 
used interchangeably with the term ‘attitude’ in much of the literature. Research 
undertaken on the attitude/rationalisation element of the FT is often from 
sociology and behaviour science perspectives (Hogan et al., 2008; Trompeter, et 
al., 2013). Unfortunately accounting literature has given this part of the Fraud 
Triangle little attention (Murphy and Dacin, 2011). Similar to the perceived 
pressure element of the FT, one cannot observe rationalisation, as it is internal to 
the fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2010, Albrecht et al., 1984) and therefore 
inherently difficult to detect.  
 
When Cressey questioned the fraudsters as to why they had committed fraud in 
their current situation but had not exploited previous fraud opportunities, some 
gave such reasons as “there was no need for it like there was this time”, “the idea 
never entered my head” and “I thought it was dishonest then, but this time it did 
not seem dishonest at first” (Cressey, 1950, 1953). Other ways the fraudsters have 
rationalised their actions were cited as follows:  “the organisation owes me”, “I 
am only borrowing the money – I will pay it back” and “the company can afford 
it” (Dellaportas, 2012).  
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Nelson et al. (2002) said that the more imprecise the accounting standards, the 
more likely it was for managers to attempt to increase earnings and also the more 
likely it was for the auditors to look for restatement of the figures. With imprecise 
accounting standards a fraudster can purport to follow the “rule” of the accounting 
standard, rather than the intention of that standard. This is more relevant under US 
GAAP, which is rule based accounting, rather than under IFRS, which apply in 
Ireland, which are principal based (AICPA, 2002). 
 
The terms rationalisation and attitude are used interchangeably in the auditing 
standards (ISA 240; SAS 99) as well as in published literature. ISA 240 gives 
examples such as “non-financial management’s excessive participation in or 
preoccupation with the selection of accounting policies or the determination of 
significant estimates” (ISA 240, p.188) or “disregard for the need for monitoring 
or reducing risks related to misappropriations of asset” (ISA 240, p. 191). The 
full list is included in Appendix A. ISA 240 attempts to present 
attitude/rationalisation which might be observable to auditors. 
 
Albrecht et al. (1984) found that even if the three elements of the FT did exist the 
individual might not necessarily commit fraud. Therefore, they refined the fraud 
triangle, replacing the rationalisation element with “personal integrity” and called 
it the Fraud Scale. Accordingly, the elements they considered as most likely to 
contribute to the occurrence of fraud are highly pressurized conditions, low 
controls and a person of low personal integrity. They observed that inappropriate 
behaviour is less likely to be rationalised by a person with high personal integrity. 
Hernández and Groot (2007) also found that some of the most important factors 
when assessing fraud risk in an audit are the managers’ integrity, candour, and 
ethics together with concerns regarding aggressive recognition of earnings and 
accounting estimates. The benefit of using personal integrity instead of 
rationalisation as an element of fraud is that strong personal and corporate ethics 
can be observed externally and inferred from past events, therefore increasing the 
chance of detecting and thus preventing fraud occurring and  reducing the risk of 
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someone justifying a fraud (Rezaee and Riley, 2009; Dorminey et al., 2010; Hill, 
2010). 
 
ISA 240 recognised that pressure is both internal and external. All examples can 
be seen in Appendix A but they included internal pressures such as “personal 
financial obligations” (ISA 240, p190) and external pressures such as “financial 
stability or profitability of threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
condition” (ISA 240, p186).   
 
Therefore, for a fraudster to rationalise the behaviour they have to convince 
themselves and others that their personal ethics or the ethics of the business are 
upheld by the committing of the fraud. However if rational judgement is 
employed in any situation, this could aid in the identification of a solution to the 
problem “without resorting to unlawful behaviour” (Dellaportas, 2012, p.2).   
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) also criticised Cressey’s (1950, 1953) Fraud 
Triangle as missing one element necessary for a fraud to take place, capability. 
They suggest that even if a situation arises where an employee has financial 
pressures, the internal controls are such that the fraud can be committed and the 
potential fraudster can rationalise the fraud, it is only if the individual has the 
“capability” that fraud will happen. They developed the Fraud Diamond by adding 
the element of “capability” to the Fraud Triangle.  
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) described how opportunity would open the door to 
fraud, incentives and rationalisation will pull them closer to that door, but the 
fraudster must have the capability to identify the opening and thereby walk 
through the door leading to the committing and the concealing of the fraudulent 
act. The potential fraudster will think:   
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“I have the necessary traits and abilities to be the right 
person to pull it off. I have recognised this particular fraud 
opportunity and can turn it into a reality.” (Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004, p.39). 
 
Rationalisation is internal to the fraudster, however personal integrity can be 
observed. Therefore, the individual’s capabilities should be considered. 
 
3.3 Individuals Capabilities and Predatory Fraudsters 
 
It has been recognised that some fraudsters just require an opportunity and that 
there may be no pressure or rationalisation needed by an individual. The FT uses 
the assumption that the fraudster is an accidental fraudster, meaning that s/he did 
not set out to intentionally defraud the organisation when s/he began the fraud and 
then as the fraud remained undetected he/she continued with the fraud (Antar, 
2010; Dorminey et al., 2010 and 2012; Kranacher et al., 2011).  
 
“Notwithstanding the fraud act, the accidental fraudster is 
considered to be a good law-abiding person who under 
normal circumstances would consider theft, breaking the law, 
or harming others.” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 21) 
 
However, predatory fraudsters do not need to rationalise their behaviour and they 
may not have any financial pressures. Predatory fraudsters, or industrial 
psychopaths, only need to see an opportunity to defraud a company and they will 
seek it out and therefore the personal capabilities of a person should be examined 
(Walters and Geyer, 2004: Wolfe and Hernanson, 2004, Perri 2004; Ramamoorti, 
2008; Dorminey et al., 2010; Kranacher et al., 2011).  
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“Criminals come up with excuses but they know what they’re 
doing and why they’re doing it. They don’t have to do it in 
most cases.” (Antar, 2010).  
 
Keeping opportunity as a common element within the FT, Dorminey et al. (2012) 
prepared a new fraud triangle to capture the essence of the predatory fraudster. 
Perceived pressure is replaced by criminal mind-set and “rationalisation” is 
replaced with arrogance. If one used the fraud scale as described in section 3.2, 
the predatory fraudster would have low personal integrity and using the fraud 
diamond as described in section 3.2.3 a predatory fraudster would have the 
capability to commit the fraud. Therefore, when protecting an organisation against 
fraud or investigating the possibility of fraud, consideration should be given to the 
idea that not all elements of the FT are needed for a fraud to take place.  
 
3.4 Subsequent Use of Fraud Triangle 
 
Subsequent researchers have modified elements of the FT to improve its 
effectiveness in the prevention and detection of fraud “where the fraud triangle 
has fallen short” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 19).  
 
As “the fraud triangle was created with the accidental fraudster in mind” 
(Dorminey et al., 2010, p.21), it is not always effective in determining the actions 
of a predatory fraudster or of fraud by collusion or management override (Wolfe 
and Hermanson, 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010 and 2012). By using other tools 
such as the Fraud Scale (as discussed in section 3.2.1), the Fraud Diamond (as 
discussed in section 3.2.3) or MICE (as discussed in section 3.2.1) to investigate 
fraud, audit professionals should have a better chance of detecting and preventing 
both predatory and accidental fraudsters (Dorminey et al., 2012). Dorminey et al., 
(2012) considered this framework useful in extending the observable elements of 
fraud, thereby improving the detectability of fraud. They see this expanded fraud 
triangle as a better tool for assisting auditors, as they “will consider all the 
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necessary factors contributing to the occurrence of fraud. This should help them 
in effectively assessing fraud risk” (Kassem and Higson, 2012, p195).  
 
Figure 3.2:  The New Fraud Triangle Model 
 
Reproduced from Kassem and Higson (2012) 
 
The “new fraud triangle” model encompasses the subsequent research of the 
elements of the fraud triangle and transforms the elements that are internal to a 
fraudster and makes them observable. The observable behaviour of individuals 
has also been researched in sociology literature. 
 
3.5 Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)  
 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1974) sociologists developed the “Theory of Reasoned 
Action” (TRA) to predict dishonest actions. Ajzen (1991) enhanced the TRA and 
developed the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to illustrate how the behaviour 
of an individual is based on “three conceptually independent determinants of 
intention” (Ajzen, The Theory of Planned Behaviour, 1991, p. 188); namely 
attitude towards the behaviour, the subjective (societal) norms and the perceived 
behavioural controls. A person will evaluate firstly their behaviour based on their 
“attitude towards the behaviour,” secondly the “social pressure” to perform or not 
Motivation 
(MICE 
Model)
Opportunity
Fraudster's 
Capabilities
(Fraud 
Diamond)
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Integrity 
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perform an action and thirdly the “perceived ease or difficulty of performing” the 
action (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). Beck and Ajzen (1991) added a fourth concept of 
“personal feelings of moral obligation”. Any of these factors can determine 
whether a person will undertake or not undertake an action. An individual is 
therefore assumed to be driven by their personal beliefs, the organisational or 
societal ethics, their assessment as to the likelihood of being caught and punished 
for their behaviour and their moral belief system.  
 
Predicting individuals’ behaviour using the TPB framework has been examined 
and verified  in many different environments such as health (Godin and Kok, 
1996), electronic commerce adoption (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006) and physical 
activity (Hagger et al., 2002). Gillett and Uddin (2005) found that using the theory 
of planned action explained managements’ attitudes towards fraud. Carpenter and 
Reimers (2005) also found that the theory of planned behaviour could explain 
fraudulent and unethical behaviour. 
 
3.6 Combined FT/TPB Framework 
 
Following on from the verification of the TPB framework, Cohen et al. (2010) 
combined the TPB and the FT as they felt they are complementary theories, which 
overlap for a number of areas of fraud. By incorporating the four concepts of the 
TPB as an adjunct to the attitude/rationalisation element of fraud triangle, they 
produced the FT/TPB framework (as shown in Figure 3.3). 
 
Cohen et al. (2010) felt that by extending the rationalisation element of the fraud 
triangle to include the attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived 
behaviour controls and moral obligation made the most unobservable element of 
the fraud triangle more visible to the auditor. 
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“Of these three points of the fraud triangle, this corner is 
arguably the most difficult for the auditor to assess. Attitudes 
and rationalizations are cognitive and therefore internal by 
nature. They may be hidden or suppressed in order to 
deceive. Often, the best the auditor can do is to make 
inferences as to the attitudes managers may possess.” (Cohen 
et al., 2010, p.273).  
 
Cohen et al. (2010) examined press reports of thirty-nine cases of fraud in the US 
that went public from 1992-2005. Unlike other researchers, they did not look to 
the intention of the fraudster, but rather focused on the action of fraudsters as 
reported in the press. By integrating the FT and the TPB, they analysed the reports 
of fraud and cross-referenced the actual reported behaviour and attitudes to the 
relevant auditing standard (SAS 99 “Consideration of Fraud”). 
 
“It is potentially important that the professional standards 
that are related to fraud detection strengthen the emphasis on 
managers’ behaviour that may be associated with unethical 
behaviour.” (Cohen et al., 2010, p.271)  
 
The results of their study suggest that auditors should evaluate the ethics of 
management through the assessment of attitude, subjective norms, perceived 
behavioural control, and moral obligation.  
 
“One implication from the results of our study is that auditors 
should place a special emphasis on evaluating the ethics of 
individuals through the assessment of attitude, subjective 
norms, perceived behavioural control and moral obligation-
the components of the TPB.” (Cohen et al., 2010, p.288) 
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Figure 3.3 Combining the Fraud Triangle (FT) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)  
+
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Reproduced from Cohen et al. (2010)
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Cohen et al. (2010) also used the other elements of the FT, pressures, and 
opportunities, to assess the relevance of that framework in the context of the 
frauds in their study. They found that pressures and opportunities were present in 
all the cases examined, however they found some of the pressures and 
opportunities identified in the cases studied were not included in SAS 99.   
 
The research undertaken by Cohen et al. (2010) was considered “novel and 
unique” (Trompeter et al., 2013, p. 293). Their research noted gaps in the auditing 
standards and suggested additions, especially to the attitudes/rationalisation 
element of the FT by using the TPB. Cohen et al. (2010) called for research to be 
undertaken in other jurisdictions, suggesting Europe in particular, using the 
FT/TPB framework. This dissertation answers that call for research and, using the 
FT/TPB framework, examines Irish Occupational Fraud. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the trajectory of fraud literature from the 1940s, with the 
development of the Fraud Triangle, which forms the basis of subsequent theories 
of fraud prevention and detection. It reviewed the research confirming the validity 
of the fraud triangle. It reviewed the research on the three elements of the fraud 
triangle, pressures, opportunities and rationalisation. It then reviewed frameworks 
that looked to expand the fraud triangle, to further develop tools to assist those 
involved in the prevention and detection of fraud. This chapter introduced the 
FT/TPB framework developed by Cohen et al. (2010) whose validity was verified 
by empirical evidence gathered from US fraud cases. The researcher will use this 
framework in this dissertation to assess the adequacy of auditing standards in the 
detection of occupational fraud. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter defines the term research. As the research methodology is 
determined by what the researcher wants to discover, this chapter sets out the 
research objective and then determines the methodology to be used to answer 
these questions. It begins with a broad discussion on research classification and 
then focuses on the appropriate research method for this study. It describes how 
the data for this study is collected, and the processes used to analyse this data. It 
presents the data which will be used in the rest of this study.  
 
4.2 Research Definitions 
 
Research can be described as work or activities undertaken by people in a 
systematic way with the aim of finding things out and increasing their knowledge 
(Barrachina et al., 2004; Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al., 2011). Systematic means 
that the researcher “follows a certain logical sequence” (Kumar, 2005, p.8) when 
carrying out the research. Finding things out suggests that the researcher has a 
clear purpose or topic that s/he wishes to find out about (Burns, 1994; Kumar, 
2005; Saunders et al., 2011). As the research, methodology is determined by what 
the researcher wants to find out, the first and most important step of the research 
process is the formulation of the research objective (Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al., 
2011). 
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4.3 Research Objective 
 
The researcher completed a Post Graduate Diploma in Forensic Accounting in 
2011. This is a qualification aimed at qualified accountants, focusing on financial 
fraud and financial investigation. Following on from this, the researcher was 
interested in doing a research Masters to investigate the profile of a fraudster in 
Ireland. As a first step in refining the research objective, the researcher conducted 
an in-depth review of extant literature in the area. According to Hakim (1987), the 
literature review is: 
 
“commonly part of the ground-clearing and preparatory work 
undertaken in the initial stages of empirical research” (Hakim, 
1987, p. 17).  
 
This groundwork then provides a platform for the research (Levin, 2008).  
 
The literature review in this instance involved searching academic journals, 
books, on-line databases, the internet, technical magazine articles and conference 
papers. The search terms “fraudster” and “profile of a fraudster” were used 
initially. While reading the resultant literature, the researcher came across the 
Cohen et al.’s (2010) article. This provided a unique framework (combining the 
fraud triangle (FT) and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB)) and a research 
methodology that appealed to the researcher. In their research, Cohen et al. (2010) 
used the FT/TPB framework to determine whether the US auditing standard 
sufficiently covered the elements of the fraud cases reported in the press. The 
researcher thought that a similar study in an Irish context would be an interesting 
and worthy topic of research.  
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The researcher then decided to examine the literature attempting to define fraud. 
Not only was it apparent that fraud is difficult to define, but it was also apparent 
that the number of convictions for fraud in Ireland appears to be significantly less 
than the number of apparent frauds committed. In order to determine how frauds 
are studied, the progression of models and theories of fraud from the 1940s to the 
present day were tracked. The auditing standard developed to assist auditors in the 
detection of fraud was reviewed, with the caveat that it is not the primary 
responsibility of the auditors to safeguard the assets of an organisation or to detect 
fraud. The directors of a company have the main responsibility for the 
safeguarding of a company’s assets. The researcher decided, based on this review 
of the literature, to also explore the other reasons for the low conviction rate for 
fraudulent activities in Ireland.  
 
From reviewing the literature available, the researcher recognised a lack of 
research into Irish occupational fraud. Cohen et al. (2010) called for their work to 
be validated in other jurisdictions. This research will answer this calling by 
replicating Cohen et al.’s work in an Irish context to determine the sufficiency of 
the International auditing standard (ISA 240). The research will also use this 
material to review the difficulties (or reluctances) in convicting occupational fraud 
in Ireland.  
 
The objective of this study is to examine: 
 
Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for, 
occupational fraud in Ireland? 
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This research aims to achieve this objective by answering the following questions: 
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of 
extant occupational fraud in Ireland? 
 
This question aims to document whether the reported facts of Irish occupational 
fraud cases correspond to the red-flags provided in ISA 240. The findings of this 
research question will be used to make recommendations to standard setters as to 
how auditing standards might be enhanced in the future.  
 
2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland? 
 
The second question aims to understand why there is a dearth of fraud convictions 
in Ireland. One of the key findings of the literature review was that convictions for 
fraud were difficult to pursue and the researcher aims to determine the main 
reasons for this difficulty.  
 
4.4 Research Methodology 
 
The research method is the logic that links data to be collected (and the conclusion 
to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study (Benbassat, 1987; Yin, 1989; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, researchers have to allow 
the particular paradigm chosen for any study to be driven by the research 
questions being investigated (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The main categorisation of 
research methodologies is that of qualitative and quantitative research. The choice 
between qualitative and quantitative modes of enquiry depends upon the aim of 
the research and the use of the findings (Kumar, 2005). Benbassat (1987) has the 
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same opinion stating that research methods are classified according to “the 
question being investigated” (Benbassat, 1987, p. 48).  
 
4.4.1 Qualitative Research Techniques 
 
Qualitative research techniques permit the interpretation of results and allow a 
creative and in-depth analysis over the course of the study. However, this can 
result in the ideal of objective collection of purely descriptive ‘facts’ becoming 
blurred (Adam and Healy, 2000). Qualitative research techniques are used as 
exploratory methods when the variables and theory base are unknown (Morse, 
1991; Creswell, 2003). According to Morse (1991): 
 
“Characteristics of a qualitative research problem are: a) the 
concept is “immature” due to a conspicuous lack of theory 
and previous research; b) a notion that the available theory 
may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; c) a 
need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to 
develop theory; or d) the nature of the phenomenon may not be 
suited to quantitative measures.” (Morse, 1991, p. 120) 
 
In qualitative research the researcher collects data in the form of words gathered 
by observations, interviews, documents, audio, visual materials and the 
researcher’s impressions and reactions (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Meyer, 1997; 
Creswell, 2003). Hakim (1987) states that qualitative research offers:  
 
“richly descriptive reports of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, 
beliefs, views and feelings, the meaning and interpretations 
given to events and things, as well as their behaviour.” (Hakim, 
1987, p. 26) 
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The data is then used to pose, refine and answer the research questions (Adam and 
Healy, 2000). It involves the researcher attempting to “make sense of, or 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998, p. 3). It is a necessity in qualitative research that the researcher 
ensures that they remain objective (Merriam, 1998). Examples of qualitative 
research are content analysis, case study research, action research and 
ethnography (Meyer, 1997). These are particularly applicable to exploratory 
research, as exploratory research is a valuable means of finding out  
 
“what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and 
to assess phenomena in a new light.” (Robson, 2002, p. 59). 
 
This is an exploratory study, as the researcher wishes to explore a research topic 
not previously examined in Ireland. The definition of fraud is non-existent in Irish 
legislation and due to the impact of occupational fraud it needs to be examined in-
depth. This research will use content analysis to examine the words used in Irish 
press reports to determine if these elements are adequately covered in the auditing 
standard. However the researcher will not limit herself to qualitative analysis, she 
will also quantitatively analyse the data where relevant to strengthen the findings. 
 
4.4.2 Quantitative Research Techniques 
 
There are those who think that when textual data is quantified the researcher’s 
objective of understanding a phenomenon from the point of view of the 
participants and its particular social and institutional context is lost (Meyer, 1997). 
They argue that quantitative analysis is too narrow, obsessively mathematical, and 
of little benefit to problems that involve complex multiple factors and uncertainty 
(Hopper et al., 2001).  
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However others believe that research processes that are purely qualitative can be 
very unrefined and less objective than quantitative approaches (Kirk and Miller, 
1998). Robson (2002) stated that there is: 
 
“no clear and accepted set of conventions for analysis 
corresponding to those observed with quantitative data.” 
(Robson, 2002, p. 370).  
 
This study is exploratory; therefore the researcher feels that in this piece of 
research the quantitative analysis adds strength to the rich findings of the 
qualitative analysis. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data 
will provide insight, discovery and interpretation which are suitable to answering 
the research question posed (Olson, 2004). 
 
4.5 Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is a research method, which “draws inferences from data by 
systematically identifying characteristics within the data” (Jones and Shoemaker, 
1994). The data used in content analysis may be from primary sources such as 
field notes or interview transcripts, or from secondary sources such as reports, 
newspaper articles or broadcasts (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The use of secondary 
data, rather than spending a lot of time collecting primary data, leaves more time 
to analyse the data. A number of approaches may be used to analyse the data. The 
researcher may use subjective analysis, a semi-objective approach, thematic, 
meaning-orientated content analysis, readability, or linguistic analysis (Beattie et 
al., 2004). The analysis enables researchers to classify content into categories and 
trends from the text, and then draw inference from them (Jones and Shoemaker, 
1994). 
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Content analysis is usually a qualitative research method used where the 
researcher is “faced with a mass of open-ended material” (Mostyn, 1985, p. 117). 
When the amount of qualitative data available is unwieldy, the researcher can 
either find a basis for selecting a sample, or use methods such as selecting words 
or phrases, a theme or time allocated to reduce the qualitative data into coding 
units (Beattie et al., 2004; Collis and Hussey, 2009). If coding units are used, a 
coding frame can be constructed to incorporate the relevant data for the study 
undertaken (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
 
“Of the semi-objective approach, some specify ex ante a 
list of items and scrutinise the text for their presence, 
ignoring sections of the text that do not relate to this list. It 
is a fairly objective, form-oriented content-analytic 
method.” (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 208)  
 
The main advantage of content analysis is its unobtrusive characteristic. 
Documents can be evaluated without the knowledge of the topic (Jones and 
Shoemaker, 1994; Kababoff et al., 1995) and the subjects included in the study 
are unlikely to be influenced in their behaviour (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Another advantage is that it uses natural verbal expressions as its database. If 
terms change over time, this method is adaptable in its analysis of text (Jones and 
Shoemaker, 1994; Kababoff et al., 1995). A further advantage is that a systematic 
and quantitative approach can be applied to qualitative data (Jones and 
Shoemaker, 1994). Collis and Hussey (2009) recommend content analysis as:  
 
“you need only select a population or sample and you 
have a permanent record which can be examined many 
times.” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 166) 
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However they also state that the main problem with content analysis is that the 
method of collecting the data may be part of the analysis and it is not always 
obvious how the research has “summarized hundreds of pages of qualitative data 
to arrive at the findings” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 163).  
 
The research objective of this study is best fulfilled by carrying out content 
analysis of press articles reporting convictions of Irish occupational fraud. The 
period from January 2002 to December 2013 was chosen, as it was subsequent to 
both the enactment of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Offences Act 2001 
on the December 2001, which is the most recent fraud related legislation in 
Ireland, and the introduction of ISA 240, which is the auditing standard against 
which the reported facts of the cases studied, will be matched. The words used in 
Irish press reports were examined to determine if these elements are adequately 
covered in the auditing standard. The results will be tabulated and qualitatively 
and quantitatively analysed to provide answers to the questions posed. 
 
4.6 Selection and Analysis of Data 
 
This study used the national newspapers and the national broadcaster as its 
sources of data. These sources reported on court cases recording details of the 
case, together with any relevant comments from judges and witnesses. Miller 
(2006) and Dyck et al. (2010) found that the media has an important role in 
monitoring accounting fraud due to the pressure it places on management. Cohen 
et al. (2010) describe two key roles of the media. Firstly, in presenting 
information it has received from other sources, such as auditors, analysts or 
lawsuits, it attracts the attention of institutions such as regulatory bodies, 
consumer groups, investment funds that may take action (Dyck et al., 2008, 
Cohen et al., 2010). Secondly, the press can add new information through its own 
investigations (Miller, 2006; Cohen et al., 2010). Miller (2006) states that an 
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investigative report can create negative reaction in the market. This finding 
suggests that the press plays an important role as a monitor or information 
intermediary in financial markets. Cohen et al. (2010) also recognized that the 
media may be tempted to “highlight fraudulent behaviour to increase circulation” 
(p.277).  
 
In this study, in the first instance the archive of “The Irish Times” was selected for 
review, as it is the biggest selling broadsheet newspaper in Ireland. The researcher 
searched the archive on a month-by-month basis, starting from February 2014 and 
working backwards to January 2002, using the search term “fraud” to isolate 
newspaper reports which included this word. The articles identified using the 
search term “fraud” were read to determine whether they were relevant to this 
study. As this research is examining occupational fraud committed by employees 
or agents of companies, in order to identify the relevant articles their content was 
scrutinised for relevance to this study. Cases of non-occupational fraud such as 
social welfare fraud, insurance fraud, marine fraud, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, or fraud against an individual were discarded. As the focus of the 
study is occupational fraud prosecuted in Ireland, cases of occupational fraud 
committed outside of Ireland were also discarded. Cases identified which related 
to Irish companies but where the fraud was committed outside of Ireland 
(Greencore – Campsie fraud in Scotland) were also discarded.   
 
The archives of the other main broadsheets in Ireland, The Irish Independent 
(www.irishindependent.ie), The Irish Examiner (www.irishexaminer.com) and the 
main national broadcaster Radio Telifis Eireann (www.rte.ie) were searched to 
corroborate the details of cases identified and to identify any further cases. Details 
of two further cases were found using these sources, as the reports of these cases 
included in the Irish Times archives included insufficient detail to enable full 
analysis of the facts of the case.  
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The researcher reviewed all of the articles that referred to convictions for 
occupational fraud in Ireland from 2002 to 2013 and confirmed, by re-reading 
them, that they were convictions under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) 
Offences Act 2001. These cases were then re-read to confirm that they relate to 
occupational fraud in Ireland in the relevant time. The result of this review formed 
a full population of forty-one occupational fraud cases convicted from 1 January 
2002 to 31 December 2013 and reported on in the Irish media (see Table 4.1 
below).  
 
Of the forty-one cases, there were eleven convictions where the fraudsters acted in 
collusion. These frauds were targeted against five organisations (Bovale 
Developments, Professional Door Staff Limited, Coca Cola/Robert Roberts, HSE 
and Eircom). By combining the cases of collusion to one case of fraud against an 
employer, the population of cases was reduced to thirty-five unique occupational 
fraud cases for inclusion in the analysis.  
 
The content of each of the relevant press articles was firstly categorised into the 
types of fraud committed and given the code AM for asset misappropriation or 
FFR for fraudulent financial reporting. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 were produced 
from this data detailing the value of each type of fraud and how it was committed. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 were later used to illustrate the multifarious ways in which 
fraud can be committed.  
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Table 4.1 Irish Occupational Fraud (January 2002 to December 2013) 2 
  
Company Name Publication 
Date 
published 
1 Eddie Rockets3 John Carlos www.irishtimes.ie 04/02/2014 
2 
National Concert 
Hall, Forest Tosca 4 
Mary 
O'Toole 
www.irishtimes.ie 17/01/2014 
3 
Bovale 
Development 
Michael 
Bailey 
www.irishtimes.ie 10/12/2013 
4 
Bovale 
Development 
Thomas 
Bailey 
www.irishtimes.ie 10/12/2013 
5 Whelan Group Enda Whelan www.irishexaminer.ie 20/07/2013 
6 Dáil Eireann Ivor Callely www.irishtimes.ie 11/07/2013 
7 Sunmount Services 
Karl 
McCaughley 
www.irishtimes.ie 30/04/2013 
8 
Dept of Social and 
Family affairs (1) 
Brian King www.irishtimes.ie 11/04/2013 
9 
Begley Brothers 
Limited 
Paul Begley www.irishtimes.ie 10/03/2013 
10 
Professional Door 
Staff Limited 
Anthony 
Malone 
www.irishtimes.ie 23/02/2013 
11 
Professional Door 
Staff Limited 
Enda 
O'Rafferty 
www.irishtimes.ie 23/02/2013 
                                                 
2  Searches of the archives were undertaken in January and February 2014 and all the cases 
included here were reviewed during those dates  
3 This case was sentenced in 2014 but related to a conviction in 2013 so it was included in the 
study 
4 This case was sentenced in 2014 but related to a conviction in 2013 so it was included in the 
study 
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Company Name Publication 
Date 
published 
12 
Loganroy 
Consultants 
Limited 
Gary Wynne www.irishtimes.ie 14/01/2013 
13 
Charterhouse 
Mortgage Centre 
Limited 
Gerard 
Killally 
www.irishtimes.ie 26/11/2012 
14 Derek Floyd Derek Floyd www.irishtimes.ie 25/05/2012 
15 
Connolly Sellor 
Geraghty 
Gary Carroll www.irishtimes.ie 20/01/2012 
16 
Mayo County 
Council 
Tom Gilboy www.irishtimes.ie 26/11/2011 
17 
Dept of Social and 
Family affairs (2) 
Donal 
McBride 
www.irishtimes.ie 25/05/2011 
18 FAS 
James 
Brooke-
Tyrell 
www.rte.ie 30/03/2011 
19 AJH Construction 
Alan James 
Hynes 
www.irishtimes.ie 01/03/2011 
20 
Ancove Enterprises 
Limited 
Chelyl 
Nielsen 
www.irishtimes.ie 10/02/2010 
21 Bank Of Ireland (1) 
Susan 
Dowling 
www.irishtimes.ie 23/01/2010 
22 Bank Of Ireland (2) 
Wiktor 
Wolcaski 
www.irishtimes.ie 20/10/2009 
23 Vodafone Niall Barron www.irishtimes.ie 01/07/2009 
24 Bank Of Ireland (3) 
Darren 
McComiskey 
www.irishtimes.ie 17/03/2009 
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Company Name Publication 
Date 
published 
25 
Coca Cola, Robert 
Roberts 
Stephen 
Doyle 
www.irishtimes.ie 18/12/2008 
26 
EBS, Musgrave 
C&C 
Emer Kelly www.irishtimes.ie 18/12/2008 
27 
Coca Cola, Robert 
Roberts 
Darren Cahill www.irishtimes.ie 18/12/2008 
28 
Coca Cola, Robert 
Roberts 
David Neill www.irishtimes.ie 18/12/2008 
29 
Galway County 
Council 
Michael Fahy www.irishtimes.ie 03/12/2008 
30 
Revenue 
Commissioners 
Michelle 
Twomey 
www.irishtimes.ie 05/10/2008 
31 Autoglass Claire Mahon www.irishtimes.ie 03/05/2008 
32 Brown Thomas 
Adam 
Brennan 
www.irishtimes.ie 12/03/2008 
33 
Celerity Fluid 
Systems 
Ann Levins www.irishtimes.ie 14/10/2006 
34 
European 
commission office 
Ann Levins www.irishtimes.ie 05/10/2006 
35 HSE (1) 
Cara 
Canavan 
www.irishtimes.ie 08/03/2006 
36 HSE (2) 
Abotomi L 
Adedeji 
www.irishtimes.ie 10/02/2006 
37 HSE (2) 
Olusola A 
Falegan 
www.irishtimes.ie 10/02/2006 
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Company Name Publication 
Date 
published 
38 Johnson Controls 
Timothy 
Elliot 
www.irishtimes.ie 02/02/2005 
39 Eircom 
Damien 
Vaughan 
www.irishtimes.ie 13/11/2004 
40 Eircom 
Eugene 
Fitzsimons 
www.irishtimes.ie 13/11/2004 
41 
Irish County 
Houses and 
Restaurant 
Association 
Aoife Byrne www.irishtimes.ie 27/10/2004 
 
 
The next step was the extraction of the relevant content from the articles (such as 
quotes from the fraudster, rulings from judges in the cases and journalists’ 
analyses) and the allocation of these to each of the elements of the Fraud Triangle 
(pressures, opportunity and rationalisation) and the elements of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived behaviour 
controls, and moral obligation). The results are presented in Table 5.4. This was 
subsequently used to prove that the FT/TPB model was suitable for this study. 
 
The elements included in Table 5.4 were then further coded by examining 
whether they were present or not present in the red-flags, given by way of 
examples in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240). They were coded, in the 
same manner as that used by Cohen et al. (2010), by being marked as P if it was 
present in ISA 240 or NP if it was not present in ISA 240. The results are 
presented in Table 6.1. It is the qualitative and quantitative analysis of this data 
that provides the answer to the first research question posed in this study.  Table 
5.4 and table 6.1 will be discussed in chapters five and six. 
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The researcher completed this research of Irish occupational fraud to validate the 
findings of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context and to make a valuable 
contribution to corporate governance and financial accounting literature in 
Ireland.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The research objective and the resultant research questions were clarified in this 
chapter. This clarification was then used to identify the research methodology to 
be used. While this exploratory research is qualitative by nature, this chapter 
justified the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches applied to the data 
extracted from press reports and the subsequent comparison to the red-flags 
identified in the auditing standard.  
 
Using the data identified from the content analysis, the validity of the use of the 
FT/TPB framework will be tested in Chapter five and then a further analysis of 
the data will provide answers to the research questions in the final chapter of this 
dissertation.                                           
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Chapter 5 Relevance of the FT/TPB Framework  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter elucidates the initial part of the findings of this research. It divides 
the Irish occupational fraud cases from 2002 to 2013 into two categories: Asset 
Misappropriation (AM) or Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). These are the 
two categories used in both Cohen et al.’s (2010) work, which this study is 
paralleling in an Irish context, and in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240). It 
then lists the methods used to commit the acts of fraud in the Irish cases. 
Ultimately, it compares the elements of the Irish cases to the Fraud Triangle and 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (FT/TPB) framework to determine whether it is a 
relevant framework to use in this study. 
 
5.2 Types of Occupational Fraud 
 
The reports of the Irish press were scrutinised over a twelve year period, from 
2002 to 2013, and identified thirty-five cases of occupational fraud in Ireland, 
involving forty-one fraudsters. In thirty of these cases the fraudsters were 
employees or directors of the organisations, in the remaining five cases the 
fraudsters were contractors to the organisations. The value of the thirty-five 
occupational fraud cases in this study was almost €19.3 million. These are 
categorised into Asset Misappropriation and Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 
Table 5.1 below. This is the categorisation used in the auditing standards and 
throughout this study  
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Table 5.1: Value of fraud in Irish cases from 2002-2013 
Type of Fraud Value of Fraud (€) Total Cases 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)            12,641,000  6 
Asset Misappropriation (AM)             6,642,000  29 
Total         €19,283,000  35 
 
Of the thirty-five cases of fraud identified, twenty-nine were AM and only six 
were FFR. As shown in Table 5.1 above, the twenty-nine cases of AM totalled 
€6,642,000, whereas the six cases of FFR totalled €12,641,000. Even though the 
number of cases of FFR is significantly lower than the cases of AM, it does need 
to be analysed, as the total value of fraud by FFR is nearly twice the overall value 
of the AM fraud documented.  
 
5.2.1 Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) 
 
FFR is when the financial reports of the organisation are deliberately manipulated. 
The methods used to perpetrate FFR in the six Irish cases are established in Table 
5.2 below.  
 
Table 5.2: Methods and Values of FFR cases  
Method of FFR  Value of Fraud (€) Cases studied 
PAYE/PRSI fraud          6,000,000                                   1  
Excise Duty fraud 1,600,000                                 1 
VAT fraud          1,041,000                                   3  
Invoice discounting fraud          4,000,000                                   1  
Total       €12,641,000                                   6  
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Five of the six cases are due to the deliberate falsification of financial records to 
reduce the tax liability of the organisation. The largest of these cases, valuing €6 
million was to reduce the PAYE/PRSI payable to the revenue commissioners and 
the other four were to reduce the companies’ liability of VAT. In the first case, the 
directors of Bovale underestimated the gross earnings of the directors over a two-
year period, using, according to the Judge in the case, “systematic falsification" of 
records. The (PricewaterhouseCoopers) PwC partner reviewing the case stated 
that in his 35-year career he had “never encountered such a failure to maintain 
proper books and records” (Irish Times, 10/2/13). Another FFR case is the 
infamous garlic fraud case, where the director of Begley Brothers deliberately 
mislabelled the import of Chinese garlic as apples to avail of a lower rate of 
excise duty. In doing so, the company saved €24,000 per shipment. The overall 
cost of the fraud was a €1.6 million loss to the exchequer. The sixth case of FFR 
involved a director of the Whelan group falsifying the accounting records for the 
purposes of invoice discounting, thereby defrauding the Bank of Scotland of €6 
million. The prosecution in the case did not believe that a fraud of this scale could 
be carried out over such a long period by a single director, however only one 
individual was convicted in the case.  
 
Even though there were only six convictions for FFR in Ireland between 2002 and 
2013, it is the value of the fraud that is of concern here. The five tax frauds and 
the invoice discounting fraud caused a substantial loss for the exchequer and the 
bank involved. The six cases of FFR overall totalled €12,641,000. 
 
5.2.2 Asset Misappropriation (AM) 
 
In Asset Misappropriation, fraudulent measures are used to gain possession of 
assets of the company. In the twenty-nine cases of AM the means of committing 
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fraud varied widely, with ten different means identified by the researcher in Table 
5.3 below.  
 
Table 5.3: Methods and Values of AM cases 
Method of AM Value of Fraud (€) 
Cases 
Studied 
False invoices              4,802,000  8 
Cheque/credit card/bank transfers                 807,000  8 
Overriding IT systems                 506,000  3 
False expense/overtime claim                 205,000  3 
False revenue claims for others                 160,000  2 
Customer receipts                     77,000  1 
Unauthorised work undertaken on private 
property                    30,000  1 
Cash swapped for gift cards                    20,000  1 
Forged ownership documentation                    18,000  1 
Deliberate overpayment to customer, 
keeping refund                    17,000  1 
Total              €6,642,000  29 
 
Eight cases of AM, representing 73% of the overall value of AM cases, involved 
fraudsters submitting false invoices. One of these cases involved an employee of 
Vodafone, the Financial Services Chief, submitting fictitious and inflated invoices 
for services not received by Vodafone. The total value of this fraud was 
€2,300,000. Another example of AM was €600,000 defrauded from FÁS by an 
assistant manager of video production. He created a false tendering process, 
resulting in the awarding of the contract to a company he had set up himself with 
very similar names to legitimate suppliers. The contract was awarded to his 
company named “The Yard Media” (the former supplier was named “Yard Media 
Limited”). In that case, the judge stated that given  
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“the prevalence of this type of crime, the significant breach of 
trust and the very skilful sustained way  [the fraudster] had 
put together bogus companies and maintained the charade 
for five years” (www.rte.ie , 30/3/11) 
 
the courts need to have the full force of the law to ensure prosecution of those 
who breach the trust of an employer, especially when there is no hope of 
restitution. Another example involved an agent of Coca Cola and Robert Roberts 
building-up a good reputation and credit history and then defrauding the 
companies of €800,000. 
 
A further eight cases, totalling almost €807,000, involved fraudsters using 
company credit cards or cheques to defraud their employers. One of the cases 
consisted of an employee using a credit card under the name of one of the 
directors resulting in a loss of €78,000 to the company. The other six cases arose 
from the fraudsters having cheques written under false pretences in their own 
names and putting the suppliers name in the cheque stub or getting cheques signed 
under false pretences by other employees. In a further case, a long-standing 
employee of Eddie Rockets forged cheques and then, by moving the money from 
one account to the other, tried to hide what he was doing.  
 
There were three cases of fraudsters overriding IT systems resulting in total losses 
of €506,000. Two of these cases took place in Bank of Ireland. In one case an 
employee gave his girlfriend an unauthorised overdraft and in the other a bank-
teller skimmed customers’ credit cards while working at the bank counter. In the 
third case of this category, an employee of the HSE knew her supervisor’s 
password and authorised payments totally €146,000 to herself.  
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There were also three cases of false claims for expenses or overtime. Two 
politicians made false expense claims; one was convicted of submitting €15,000 
false telephone invoices and the other claimed €43,000 of false travel expense 
from Mayo Council. The third case of false expense claims involved a 
Department of Social Affairs Senior Manager over-claiming €147,000 of 
overtime, by adding his name to the end of the approved overtime lists.  
 
In a further two cases the fraud was carried for the benefit of someone else. In one 
case, a Revenue Commissioner employee gave €108,000 tax refunds to family 
and friends. The other case is where two HSE employees falsely approved 
€52,000 allowances for family members. In both cases the recipients had not 
requested the refunds and allowances. 
 
The five remaining cases were for smaller amounts, with one occurrence of each 
type of fraud. In Ancove Enterprises Limited, the accountant kept payments 
received from customers and then raised credit notes to cover the monies taken. In 
another case a Galway County Councillor got council workers to undertake 
€30,000 of unsanctioned work on his private property. In a further case an 
employee replaced cash taken in with used gift vouchers. A director of 
Charterhouse Mortgage Centre, which was in liquidation at the time of the fraud, 
forged ownership documents of company assets and then removed them from the 
premises. Finally a Department of Social and Family Affairs employee purposely 
gave clients overpayments and then requested the overpayment to be refunded and 
he kept the money received.  
 
The multiplicity of methods used to carry out AM fraud may be one of the reasons 
that it is difficult to detect. In the cases reported between 2002 and 2013 in Ireland 
there were ten methods ranging from complex methods of false invoicing and 
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overriding IT systems to more simple methods of false expense and overtime 
claims. 
  
5.3 FT/TPB Framework 
 
Cohen et al. (2010), in their study of thirty-nine cases of fraudulent activity in the 
US, used a FT/TPB framework (See figure 3.3), which combined the Fraud 
Triangle (FT) with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). In the FT framework 
the elements of fraud are divided into incentive/pressure, opportunities and 
attitude/rationalisation. The TPB framework further divides the 
attitude/rationalisation element into attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, 
perceived behaviour controls and moral obligation (see Table 5.4). Using the 
FT/TPB framework, Cohen et al. (2010) compared actual reported fraudulent 
behaviour in the thirty-nine US cases to the relevant auditing standard (SAS 99), 
the US equivalent to ISA 240.  
 
To determine whether the FT/TPB framework is suitable to this current study, the 
Irish press reports of the thirty-five cases identified were analysed according to 
the FT/TPB framework. The findings of the in-depth analysis of the press articles 
of the occupational fraud cases identified are presented in Table 5.4 below. This 
table categorises the reported details of the cases into incentive/pressure, 
opportunities and rationalisations. The rationalisations were further analysed into 
attitude toward fraud, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and moral 
obligation. 
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 Table 5.4: Irish Occupational Fraud (2002-2013) mapped to FT/TPB 
No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
1 AJH Construction  
(3/1/11) 
A J Hynes Significant 
financial interest in 
company and 
recurring negative 
cash flow  
False invoices 
to pay less 
VAT  
Minimise 
earnings for 
tax-motivated 
reasons  
  Put money 
back into 
the 
company  
M Director 110  
2 Ancove Enterprises 
Ltd (10/2/10) 
C Neilson Lavish Lifestyle  Kept customer 
payments and 
raised credit 
notes 
    F Financial 
Controller 
77 42 
3 Autoglass 
 (3/5/08) 
C Mahon Lavish Lifestyle  Wrote cheques 
to herself and 
put suppliers 
name on stub  
    F Clerical 99 25 
4 Bank of Ireland (1) 
(23/1/10) 
S Dowling Keeping up with 
peers lifestyle  
Got other 
departments to 
write her 
cheques  
Disregard for 
internal 
controls  
   F Manager 103 37 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
5 Bank of Ireland (2) 
(20/10/09) 
W Wolcaski Personal Debts of 
girlfriend  
Gave his 
girlfriend an 
overdraft 
facility  
Disregard for 
internal 
controls and 
Felt he would 
only be 
reprimanded 
  To help his 
girlfriend’s 
financial 
position  
M Clerical 40 29 
6 Bank of Ireland (3) 
(17/3/09) 
D McComiskey Under pressure 
from East European 
bouncers  
Skimmed 
customers 
card  
  Tried to take 
sick leave 
but felt 
forced into it 
(weak)  
 M Clerical 320 24 
7 Begley Brothers 
Ltd 
(10/3/13) 
P Begley Significant 
financial interest in 
company  
Using 
inappropriate 
means to 
reduce Excise 
duty bill  
Minimise 
earnings for 
tax-motivated 
reasons  
  The Excise 
duty 
charge on 
garlic was 
excessive 
M Director 1,600 147 
8 Bovale 
Development 
(10/12/13) 
M and T Bailey Significant 
financial interest in 
company  
Consistent and 
deliberate 
false 
accounting  
Minimise 
earnings for 
tax-motivated 
reasons 
  To 
minimise 
cash 
outflow  
M Director 6,000 47 
and 
60 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
9 Brown Thomas 
(3/12/08) 
A Brennan Credit card Debt  Swapped cash 
for gift 
voucher  
    M Clerical 20 26 
10 Celerity Fluid 
Systems 
(14/10/06) 
A Levis Tarot card and 
physhic line debts 
and paying back 
others  defrauded 
Ordered and 
intercepted a 
cc for director  
   Using 
proceeds to 
payback 
previous 
victims 
F Clerical 78 35 
11 Charterhouse 
Mortgage Centre 
(26/11/12) 
G Killally Company had gone 
into liquidation 
Forged 
documents to 
say they 
belonged to 
him  
Made no 
distinction 
between 
business and 
personal 
assets  
   M Director 18 42 
12 Coca Cola/Robert 
Roberts 
(16/12/08) 
D Neill, D 
Cahill and S 
Doyle 
Assets sold on  False invoices 
after giving 
false credit 
checks  
Companies 
were large so 
wouldn’t be 
affected 
   M Contractor 800 49, 
35, 
36 
13 Connolly Sellor 
Geraghty  
(20/1/12) 
G Carroll Gambling debt  Transferred 
cash between 
different 
accounts  
    M Book 
keeper 
261 52 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
14 Dáil Eireann 
(11/7/13) 
I Callely  False expense 
claims  
Sense of 
entitlement 
   M Politician 15 54 
15 Dept. of Social and 
Family Affairs (1)  
(11/4/13) 
B King Gambling debt  Overpaid 
recipients, then 
requested a 
refund  
Increased 
workload 
since 
recession  
   M Senior 
Manager 
17 48 
16 Dept. of Social and 
Family Affairs (2) 
(25/5/11) 
D McBride Alcoholic and 
Depressed  
Put his name 
onto overtime 
list after it was 
approved  
Disregard for 
internal 
controls  
   M Senior 
Manager 
147 57 
17 D Floyd  
(25/5/12) 
D Floyd VAT fraud and he 
got % of proceeds  
False invoices 
for VAT claim  
 He felt he 
was the 
fall guy for 
the crime  
  M Director 680 33 
18 EBS, Musgraves, 
C&C 
(18/12/08) 
E Kelly Asset rich, cash 
poor  
Cashed false 
cheques  
   Didn’t 
want to let 
staff go  
F Owner 50 42 
19 Eddie Rockets 
(2/4/14) 
J Carlos Gambling  Pretended he 
was an 
accountant and 
forged signature  
    M Manager 135 74 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
20 Eircom 
(13/11/04) 
D Vaughan and 
E Fitzsimons 
 Produced false 
invoices  
    M Managers 88 30 
and 
46 
21 European 
Commission Office 
(5/10/06) 
A Levins  Forged 
cheques and 
cashed them 
She continued 
to defraud 
after she was 
discovered  
   F Clerical 64 35 
22 FAS 
(30/3/11) 
J Brooke-Tyrell Living beyond his 
means  
False invoices 
with names 
deliberately 
similar to 
existing 
suppliers 
He wished to 
maintain his 
lifestyle  
   M Manager 600 53 
23 Galway County 
Council 
(3/12/08) 
M Fahy Work carried out 
on his own land  
Requested 
works on his 
own land  
   If the 
money 
wasn’t 
spent they 
would not 
be 
available 
next year  
M Politician 30 57 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
24 HSE (1)  
(8/3/06) 
C Canavan Lavish Lifestyles  Knew her 
supervisor 
password and 
approved 
fictional 
payments  
    F Clerical 146 33 
25 HSE (2) 
(10/2/06) 
O Ayodele 
Falegan and A 
Lateef Adedeji 
 Got 
allowances 
and payments 
for partners  
    M Clerical 52  
26 Irish Country 
Houses and 
Restaurant 
Association 
(27/10/04) 
A Byrne Depression  Wrote cheques 
to herself  
    F Clerical 17  
27 Johnson Controls 
(2/2/05) 
T Elliot Gambling  Created false 
invoices for 
payment  
    M Clerical 21 40 
28 Loganroy 
Consultants Ltd 
(14/1/13) 
G Wynne Significant 
financial interest in 
company  
False invoices 
for VAT claim  
To reduce 
VAT payment  
   M Director 759 38 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
29 Mayo County 
Council 
(26/11/11) 
T Gilboy Wanted to make his 
wife feel better  
False expenses  Bigger fish 
had gotten 
away with it 
   M Clerical 43 46 
30 National Concert 
Hall/Forest Tosca 
(17/1/14) 
M O’Toole Personal Debt  False Invoices      F Bookkeeper 190 44 
31 Professional Door 
Staff Ltd 
(20/7/12) 
E O’Rafferty 
and A Malone 
Significant 
financial interest in 
company and 
recurring negative 
cash flow  
False invoices 
for VAT claim 
To reduce 
VAT payment 
 No business 
knowledge 
 M Directors 172 39, 
37 
32 Revenue 
Commissioners 
(5/10/08) 
M Twomey Gave rebates of tax 
to friends  
Approved 
rebates  
Disregard for 
internal 
controls  
  They 
didn’t ask 
for rebates  
F Clerical 108 48 
33 Sunmount Services 
Ltd 
(30/4/13) 
K McCaughley Lavish Lifestyle  Falsified sales 
records  
Turned up for 
hearing in 
new car but 
not enough to 
pay back 
   M Agent 123 40 
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No Company/Date 
Reported 
Name Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude 
towards 
fraud 
Subjective 
norms 
Perceived 
behaviour 
control 
Moral 
Obligation 
M/F Position Value 
of 
Fraud 
€’000 
Age 
34 Vodafone 
(7/1/09) 
N Barron Lavish Lifestyle  Requested 
services from 
his own 
company at 
inflated prices  
Disregard for 
internal 
controls  
   M Manager 2,300  
35 Whelan Group 
(20/7/13) 
E Whelan Cash flow 
difficulties  
False records 
for invoice 
discounting  
 Could not 
have acted 
alone  
  M Director 4,000  
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It is evident from Table 5.4 that the incentive/pressure is reported in the majority 
of the case reports (thirty-one of the thirty five cases) and opportunity is reported 
in all of the cases. Therefore the first two elements of the FT framework are 
relevant to this study.  
 
In relation to the attitude/rationalisation element, all of the FFR cases mentioned 
an attitude/rationalisation, however it was not mentioned in eleven of the twenty-
nine AM press reports. There are three possible reasons for this. Firstly, just 
because it wasn’t in the press report does not necessarily mean that it was not 
mentioned in the court cases, the press reporters may just not have found it 
newsworthy. Secondly, the rationalisation is internal to the fraudster, so it may not 
even have been discussed and consequently not reported in the court case.  
Thirdly, two of the cases involved a number of fraudsters acting together and two 
of the cases had serial fraudsters. As discussed in the literature review, this type of 
fraudster may require no excuses or rationalisations to commit a fraud (Dorminey 
et al., 2012). The remaining twenty-four cases had thirty-two instances of 
attitude/rationalisation mentioned. These thirty-two instances were further 
categorised into the four elements of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Twenty of 
the instances referred to the attitude towards fraud, three referred to subjective 
norms, one to perceived behavioural controls and eight to the moral obligation 
category. Therefore attitude/rationalisation, even though not included in all the 
press reports, still is an important element of these cases. Overall, the contents of 
the reported facts of the Irish fraud cases examined in the period 2002 to 2013 can 
be readily matched to the FT/TPB framework, deeming it to be a relevant model 
to use in this Irish context. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
This study identified thirty-five cases of occupational fraud in Ireland reported in 
the press from January 2002 to December 2013. Auditing standards and the Fraud 
Triangle categorise occupational fraud into Fraudulent Financial Reporting and 
Asset Misappropriation. This chapter began by categorising the Irish cases in this 
manner. Of the thirty-five cases of Irish fraud, six related to FFR and twenty-nine 
to AM. However when the value of the fraud was calculated, it was found that the 
six FFR cases result in over 66% of the total value of fraud in the eleven year 
period analysed in this study, emphasising the need to examine both types of 
fraud. This chapter then confirmed the multiplicity of methods used to carry out 
fraud, by sub-categorising FFR and AM cases by the methods used to defraud an 
employer. It found four methods of committing FFR and ten methods of 
committing AM.  
 
The content of the press reports of the thirty-five Irish cases from 2002 to 2013 
were then analysed using the FT/TPB framework, to determine whether that 
framework could be applied to study of Irish fraud cases. The contents of the 
press reports were broken-down into incentive, opportunity and attitude towards 
fraud, subjective norms, perceived behaviour controls and moral obligation. This 
analysis established the relevance of the FT/TPB framework to the study of Irish 
fraud as all of the elements of the FT were available in most of the cases. Using 
this framework, the reported facts of the Irish occupational fraud cases will be 
compared to the content of the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240), in chapter 6, 
to determine the adequacy of the auditing standard in detecting fraud.  
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Chapter 6 Adequacy of Auditing Standard in Ireland 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the adequacy of the auditing standard in detecting 
occupational fraud in Ireland. The relevant auditing standard in Ireland is ISA 240 
“The auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial 
statements.” In this chapter, the content of the press reports of the Irish cases of 
occupational fraud from 2002 to 2013 is compared to the red-flags5  given to 
auditors in ISA 240 to establish whether the auditing standard includes or does not 
include examples of the elements of extant reported fraud cases in Ireland. It uses 
the elements of the FT/TPB framework to make this comparison. 
 
6.2 FT/TPB framework to assess ISA 240  
 
As stated in Chapter 2 of this study, ISA 240 “The auditor’s responsibilities 
relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements” is the auditing standard used 
in Ireland to guide auditors in the detection of fraud. It splits fraud into Asset 
Misappropriation (AM) and Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). It presents red 
flags, by way of examples, to guide auditors to identify behaviours and situations 
which may indicate conditions where fraud has occurred or may have occurred in 
each of the two categories of fraud. These examples are included in Appendix A. 
 
In Chapter 5 of this study, the thirty-five Irish cases, as presented in the press 
articles, were analysed using the FT/TPB framework, where the content of the 
press reports was split into the elements of the Fraud Triangle (FT) and the 
attitude/rationalisation element was further sub-divided into the elements of the 
                                                 
5 Auditors commonly refer to risk indicators as red-flags. These were discussed in section 2.8. 
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Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). The current chapter compares that analysis 
with the language and examples used in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240). 
The resulting analysis is presented in Table 6.1 below. 
 
In Table 6.1 the columns titled “P” identify the elements reported in the Irish 
fraud cases which were present in ISA 240, the columns titled “NP” identify 
elements of the Irish cases of fraud which were not present in ISA 240. The 
incentives/pressure elements present and not present in ISA 240 are shown in 
more detail in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. The opportunities elements 
present in ISA 240 are shown in more detail in Table 6.4. The 
attitude/rationalisation elements present in ISA 240 are shown in more detail in 
Table 6.5. Using the TPB, the attitude/rationalisation elements are further sub-
divided into four elements. Those elements not present in ISA 240 are represented 
in Table 6.6, Table 6.7, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9.  
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Table 6.1: Elements of Irish occupational fraud cases 2002 -2013 mapped to red flags in ISA 240 
 
No. Companies FFR/ 
AM 
Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude/rationalisation 
Attitude 
towards 
Fraud 
Subjective 
Norms 
Perceived 
behavioural 
control 
Moral 
Obligatio
n 
P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP 
1 AJH Construction FFR            
2 Ancove Enterprises Ltd AM            
3 Autoglass AM            
4 Bank of Ireland (1) AM            
5 Bank of Ireland (2) AM            
6 Bank of Ireland (3) AM            
7 Begley Brothers Ltd FFR            
8 Bovale Development FFR            
9 Brown Thomas AM            
10 Celerity Fluid Systems AM            
11 Charterhouse Mortgage Centre AM            
12 Coca Cola/Robert Roberts AM            
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No. Companies FFR/ 
AM 
Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude/rationalisation 
Attitude 
towards 
Fraud 
Subjective 
Norms 
Perceived 
behavioural 
control 
Moral 
Obligatio
n 
P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP 
13 Connolly Sellor Geraghty AM            
14 Dáil Eireann AM            
15 Dept. of Social and Family Affairs (1) AM            
16 Dept. of Social and Family Affairs (2) AM            
17 D Floyd AM            
18 EBS, Musgrave, C&C AM            
19 Eddie Rockets AM            
20 Eircom AM            
21 European Commission Office AM            
22 FAS AM            
23 Galway County Council AM            
24 HSE (1) AM            
25 HSE (2) AM            
26 Irish Country Houses and Restaurant Assoc. AM            
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No. Companies FFR/ 
AM 
Incentive/ 
Pressure 
Opportunities Attitude/rationalisation 
Attitude 
towards 
Fraud 
Subjective 
Norms 
Perceived 
behavioural 
control 
Moral 
Obligatio
n 
P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP P NP 
27 Johnson Controls AM            
28 Loganroy Consultants Ltd FFR            
29 Mayo County Council AM            
30 National Concert Hall/Forest Tosca AM            
31 Professional Door Staff Ltd FFR            
32 Revenue Commissioners AM            
33 Sunmount Services Ltd AM            
34 Vodafone AM            
35 Whelan Group FFR            
 TOTAL AM 29 
FFR 6 
15 16 35 0 13 6 0 2 0 2 0 8 
 
Key:  AM = Asset Misappropriation   FFR = False Financial Reporting 
P = Present in Auditing Standards (ISA 240)  NP = Not Present in Auditing Standards (ISA 240)  
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6.3 “Incentive/pressure” in ISA 240  
 
Thirty-one of the thirty-five Irish fraud cases from 2002 to 2013 had the 
incentive/pressure element of the case reported in the press. When comparing this 
element of these thirty-one cases to the examples given in the auditing standard, it 
was found that fifteen cases reported pressures which were present in ISA 240 
(see Table 6.2 below) and the remaining sixteen reported pressures which were 
not present in ISA 240 (see Table 6.3 below).  
 
Table 6.2: Incentive/pressure present in ISA 240 
Element of 
the Fraud 
Triangle 
Red Flags as presented in ISA 240  Companies Involved  
Incentive/ 
pressure (FFR) 
Significant financial interest in the entity 
 
 
 
 
Recurring negative cash flows from 
operations or an inability to generate cash 
flows from operations while reporting 
earnings and earnings growth 
AJH Construction , Begley 
Brothers Ltd, Bovale 
Development, Loganroy 
Consultants Ltd  
 
AJH Construction , 
Professional Door Staff 
Limited, Whelan Group  
Incentive/ 
pressure (AM) 
Personal financial obligations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adverse relationship between entity and 
employees with access to assets (layoffs) 
Brown Thomas, Celerity 
Fluid Systems, Connolly 
Sellor Geraghty, Dept of 
Social and Family Affairs 
(1), EBS/Musgrave/C&C, 
Eddie Rockets, Johnson 
controls, National Concert 
Hall/Forest Tosca  
 
Charterhouse Mortgage 
Centre Limited 
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Of the thirty-one cases, six were FFR cases and twenty-five were AM cases. The 
pressure element of all six of the FFR cases examined were present in two of the 
examples given in ISA 240, with one of the cases citing both examples as 
pressures. In four of the cases those convicted of the fraud were owner/managers 
of the business defrauded and therefore had what is described in ISA 240 as a 
“significant financial interest in the entity” (ISA 240). The second pressure cited 
in three of the cases could be described as experiencing “recurring negative cash 
flows” (ISA 240). These two pressures from ISA 240 are sufficient to cover all of 
the incentive/pressure from the Irish FFR cases.  
 
The incentive/pressure reported in nine of the twenty-five AM cases is also 
present in two of the examples given in the relevant auditing standard. The first 
risk factor identified in the cases examined which is present in ISA 240 is 
personal financial obligations which “may create pressure on management or 
employees with access to cash or other assets susceptible to theft to appropriate 
those assets” (ISA 240). In eight of the cases, the fraudster had personal financial 
obligations. These obligations ranged from gambling debts, large mortgage 
repayments and debts from tarot reading and phychic lines as well as having to 
pay back previously defrauded employers. The second incentive/pressure in one 
of cases examined, which is present in ISA 240, is where there is an “adverse 
relationships between the entity and employees” where there was “known or 
anticipated future employee layoffs” (ISA 240). In the case reported, the director 
of the company was aware that the company was going into liquidation, and he 
then defrauded the company by forging asset ownership documents.  
 
In sixteen reported cases of AM in Ireland the incentive/pressure identified in the 
press reports was not present in ISA 240. This study classifies incentive/pressure 
into five categories: lavish lifestyle, pressure from criminals, greed, depression 
and concern for others (see Table 6.3 below).   
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Table 6.3: Incentive/pressure not present in ISA240 
Elements of the 
Fraud Triangle 
Examples NOT present in 
ISA 240 
Companies involved  
Incentive/pressure 
(AR) 
Lavish Lifestyle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure from criminals 
 
Greed 
 
 
Depression 
 
 
 
 
Concern for others 
 
 
 
Ancove Enterprises 
Limited, Autoglass, Bank 
of Ireland (1), Bank of 
Ireland (2), FAS, Galway 
County Council, HSE (1), 
Sunmount Services, 
Vodafone 
 
Bank of Ireland (3) 
 
Coca Cola/Robert 
Roberts, D Floyd 
 
Dept of Social and Family 
Affairs (1), Irish Country 
Houses and Restaurant 
Association 
 
Bank of Ireland (2), Mayo 
County Council, Revenue 
Commissioners 
 
 
In nine cases, the perpetrators had a lavish lifestyle that they wished to maintain. 
The researcher believes that this is beyond the scope of the pressure of personal 
financial obligations used in ISA 240. For example in one case “there was no 
excuse or desperation for funds, it was simply to lead a high life” (Irish Times 
23/01/10). The fraudster had “a swish peer group” but also had “a serious 
cocaine habit” (Irish Times 23/01/10). In another case it was noted that the 
fraudster "enjoyed a very affluent lifestyle" (Irish Times 30/04/13). Another 
fraudster “squandered money living the high life” (Irish Times 10/02/10). In 
  
92 
 
another case, an Eastern European bouncer, already convicted for other criminal 
offences, became aware that one of his customers worked in a bank. He threatened 
this customer into carrying out a skimming fraud. This pressure from criminals is 
not present in ISA 240. Another of the incentive/pressure not present in ISA 240 
was greed as was seen in the case where Floyd got his customers to invest in a 
product and then defrauded the business of part of the proceeds. In the Coca 
Cola/Robert Roberts, the company agents sold assets which they had 
misappropriated. In two cases the incentive/pressure stated in the press reports 
was depression. One of these fraudsters was considered to be “a person of 
impeccable character” (Irish Times 25/05/11), while the other fraudster was said 
to be in a severe state of depression when she undertook a “schematic fraud” 
(Irish Times 27/10/04) on her employers. In a further three cases the 
incentive/pressure was concern for others. These concerns included wanting to 
make a family and loved ones feel better, even though in none of the cases was it 
reported that these family and friends requested the perpetration of the fraud. The 
three cases involved giving unauthorised tax allowances and unauthorised 
overdraft and giving the fraudster and his wife an unauthorised trip to cheer her 
up.  
 
The examples given in ISA 240 were sufficient to cover all of the pressures 
reported in the FFR cases, but while ISA 240 does include a number of examples 
of pressures that auditors should look out for in AM cases, there is still a number 
of incentive/pressure found in the Irish cases which are not included. The findings 
of this research recommend that the examples given in ISA 240 should be 
extended to include additional elements such as lavish lifestyle, pressure from 
criminals, greed, depression and concern for others. 
 
6.4 “Opportunities” in ISA 240  
 
The opportunity element as reported by the press in all thirty-five Irish cases is 
present in the examples given in ISA 240. This is encouraging and perhaps not 
surprising as from the organisations point of view the opportunities part of the FT 
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is the element over which it has control. If the opportunity is not there, then a 
fraud cannot take place. However, fraud does take place because sometimes the 
cost of having controls is greater than the perceived costs of potential fraud, or the 
organisation is so small that the control of segregation of duties is not possible. 
These are all present in the auditing standard. 
 
In all six FFR cases the opportunity reported was present in one of the examples 
given in ISA 240 (see Table 6.4). There was what ISA 240 describes as 
“domination of management by a single person without compensating controls” 
(ISA 240) with all of the fraudsters in the Irish cases being the owner or director 
of the organisation involved.  
 
Similarly, in the AM cases, all twenty-nine of the opportunities cited in press 
reports are also present in the auditing standard (see Table 6.4). They are 
represented in five of the examples. One of the red flags of ISA 240 is the 
opportunity that exists due to having “large amounts of cash on hand or 
processed” (ISA 240). This was present in the case where an employee was in 
charge of giving the cash to the security company and noticed that the security 
company staff had dropped an envelope of gift vouchers. The employee then 
began to swap gift vouchers for cash. Another red flag in ISA 240 is “inadequate 
internal control over assets” (ISA 240). This red flag is present in two of the AM 
cases. In the first case, a director falsified documentation to claim ownership of 
company assets when the company went into liquidation. In the second case, the 
manager ordered assets for the company but took possession of them himself and 
sold them on. In both these cases there would appear to have been inadequate 
control over the physical ownership of the assets. There have also been cases 
where management have what was described by ISA 240 as “inadequate 
oversight” (ISA 240) of expenses.  
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Table 6.4: Opportunities present in ISA 240 
Element of 
the Fraud 
Triangle 
Red Flags as presented in 
ISA 240  
Companies Involved  
Opportunities 
(FFR) 
Domination of management by a 
single person without 
compensating controls 
 
AJH Construction, Begley Brothers Ltd, 
Bovale Development, Loganroy Consultants 
Limited, Professional Door Staff Limited, 
Whelan Group 
Opportunities 
(AM) 
Large amounts of cash on hand or 
processed 
 
Inadequate internal control over 
assets 
 
Inadequate oversight of senior 
management expenditure, such as 
travel and other re-imbursements 
 
Inadequate system of 
authorization and approval of 
transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate segregation of duties 
and independent checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate management 
understanding of information 
technology 
Brown Thomas 
 
 
Charterhouse Mortgage Centre Limited, 
Eircom 
 
Dail Eireann, Dept. of Social and Family 
Affairs (2), Galway County Council, Mayo 
County Council 
 
Autoglass, , Coca Cola/Robert Roberts, 
EBS/Musgrave/C and C, Eddie Rockets, 
European Commission Office, FAS, HSE 
(2), Irish Country Houses and Restaurants 
Association, National Concert Hall/Forest 
Tosca, Johnson Controls, Revenue 
Commissioners,  
 
Ancove Enterprises Limited, Bank of 
Ireland (1), Celerity Fluid Systems, 
Connolly Sellor Geraghty, Dept. of Social 
and Family Affairs (1), D Floyd, European 
Commission Office, Irish Country Houses 
and Restaurants Association, National 
Concert Hall/Forest Tosca, Sunmount 
Services, Vodafone 
 
Bank of Ireland (2), Bank of Ireland (3), 
HSE (1) 
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The four instances of inadequate oversight of expenses included submissions of 
expenses for work done on personal property, false telephone invoices, a false 
expense claim and a false overtime claim. ISA 240 also describes how an 
organisation could have an “inadequate system of authorization and approval of 
transactions” (ISA 240). Examples of such inadequacies in the Irish cases were 
that of an employee writing cheques to herself and then filling in supplier names 
in the stub or of an employee getting other departments to write them cheques. In 
another three cases, customer receipts were lodged into the fraudsters’ personal 
accounts. These breaches of control systems could also be categorised as 
“inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks” (ISA 240). Due to the 
nature and size of some of the companies involved in the study “inadequate 
segregation of duties and independent checks” (ISA 240) may be inevitable. This 
was reported in eleven of the Irish cases in this study. As more systems become 
computerised, Information Technology (IT) control systems in a business become 
increasingly important. ISA 240 includes as one of the opportunities for fraud the 
“inadequate management understanding of information technology” (ISA 240). 
This existed in three the Irish cases studied. One where the fraudster had the 
opportunity to use the IT system to give his girlfriend an overdraft facility (Bank 
of Ireland (2)), another to skim customer cards (Bank of Ireland (3)) and, a third 
using an observation of a supervisors password, which was subsequently used to 
approve fictional transactions entered on the accounting system (HSE (1)). 
 
The opportunities reported in all thirty-five of the Irish cases of fraud between 
2002 and 2013 were present in the ISA 240. As the opportunities element of the 
FT is the element that would be most visible and controllable by the companies, it 
is not surprising that opportunities to commit fraud are adequately covered by ISA 
240.  
 
6.5 “Attitude/rationalisation” in ISA 240 
 
The rationalisation element of a fraud is not always included in the media 
coverage. In eleven of the thirty-five Irish cases, no rationalisation was included 
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in the press report. On the other hand, six cases reported multiple rationalisations 
of fraud. Thirty-one instances of attitude/rationalisation were found in the twenty-
four cases for which it was reported. Ten of the thirty-one instances reported were 
in five of the FFR cases and the remaining twenty-two instances were in nineteen 
AM cases.  
 
Utilising the TPB to further subdivide the rationalisation element of the cases into 
the following four sub-categories: 
1. Attitude towards fraud.  
2. Subjective norms.  
3. Perceived behavioural control.  
4. Moral obligation.  
It was found that all of the rationalisations in the cases that are also present in ISA 
240 come under the heading of attitude towards fraud (see Table 6.5). None of the 
elements found in the other three headings were present in ISA 240 
 
6.5.1 Attitude towards Fraud in ISA 240 
 
Attitude towards fraud refers to the extent to which a person has a favourable or 
unfavourable evaluation of the behaviour in question. If a person deems the 
behaviour acceptable then they are more likely to engage in it. Attitude towards 
fraud was mentioned in the press reports of nineteen of the Irish cases. Of these 
nineteen cases only thirteen were present in five of the examples given in ISA 240 
(see Table 6.5 below). Of these thirteen cases, five were FFR and eight were AM. 
 
In the five FFR cases the attitude towards fraud reported was present in two of the 
examples given in ISA 240 (see Table 6.5). All five cases reported “an interest by 
management in employing inappropriate means to minimise reported earnings for 
tax-motivated reasons” (ISA240). The cases included under-declaration of sales 
or over-declaration of purchases to reduce VAT and Excise payments and the 
under-statement of gross remuneration of the company directors to reduce tax. 
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Two of these cases also reported that “the owner-manager makes no distinction 
between personal and business transactions” (ISA 240). In one case, the 
company directors took more income from the company than recorded in the 
accounts and in the other case the owner/manager of the business felt that the 
company’s assets belonged to him. This example was also used as a 
rationalisation in an AM case, where the VAT liability was under-declared, and 
the resulting extra revenue for the company was ploughed back into the business 
to purchase equipment. ISA 240 could use this rationalisation under AM, as well 
as FFR. 
 
In six of the eight AR cases where the attitude towards fraud reported was present 
in the auditing standard, the fraudsters used a “disregard for internal controls 
over misappropriation of assets or failing to correct known internal control” (ISA 
240) as a rationalisation for committing fraud (see Table 6.5). These cases 
involved the employee knowingly targeting poor controls, for example by 
authorising an overdraft or expense claims or overriding the physical ownership 
of assets. In one reported case the fraudster showed “behaviour indicating 
displeasure or dissatisfaction with the entity or its treatment of the employee” 
(ISA 240). He felt overworked and undercompensated for the extra workload. In 
relation to the rationalisation of “changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may 
indicate assets have been misappropriated” (ISA 240). In the fraud case 
involving FÁS the following was reported: 
 
“The court heard (the fraudster), who was on a salary of 
€50,000 a year, was living a lifestyle that could not have been 
supported by his salary. He spent the money on foreign trips, 
home improvements and driving a better car. There is no money 
left, the court heard and FÁS remains out of pocket” (www.rte.ie 
30/03/11). 
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Table 6.5: Attitude towards Fraud present in ISA 240 
Element of the Fraud 
Triangle 
Red Flags as presented in 
ISA 240  
Companies Involved  
Attitudes/Rationalisation 
(FFR) 
An interest by management in 
employing inappropriate means 
to minimise reported earnings 
for tax-motivated reasons 
 
 
 
The owner-manager makes no 
distinction between personal and 
business transactions 
AJH Construction, Begley 
Brothers Limited, Bovale 
Development, Loganroy 
Consultants Limited, 
Professional Door Staff 
Limited 
 
AJH Construction, Bovale 
Development, Charterhouse 
Mortgage Centre (AM)  
 
Attitudes/Rationalisation 
(AM) 
 
Disregard for internal controls 
over misappropriation of assets 
or failing to correct known 
internal controls 
 
 
 
Behaviour indicating displeasure 
or dissatisfaction with the entity 
or its treatment of the employee 
 
Changes in behaviour or 
lifestyle that may indicate assets 
have been misappropriated 
 
Bank of Ireland (1),Bank of 
Ireland (2), Charterhouse 
Mortgage Centre Limited, , 
Dept. of Social and Family 
Affairs (2), Revenue 
Commissioners,  Vodafone 
 
Department of Social and 
Family Affairs (1) 
 
 
FAS 
 
 
There were six AM cases where the attitude towards fraud was not present in ISA 
240. This study classifies the attitude towards fraud in these six cases into two 
categories not included in the auditing standard; sense of entitlement and no 
apparent regard for the crime committed by showing no remorse (see Table 6.6 
below).  
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In the Dáil Eireann case where a senator falsely claimed phone expenses, a sense 
of entitlement was reported.   
“This is not a case of a simple mistake or indeed 
overstretching boundaries,” the judge said. “Politicians 
are not expected to be superhuman; they are entitled to 
get it wrong. But politicians are not expected to cut 
corners and rely on entitlement for explaining 
misbehaviour or indeed criminal acts.” (Irish Times 
28/07/14) 
This sense of entitlement was not present in ISA 240. 
Table 6.6:  Attitude towards Fraud not present in ISA 240 
Element of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour 
Examples NOT present 
in ISA 240 
Companies Involved  
Attitude towards fraud Sense of Entitlement 
 
No apparent regard for 
crime committed  
 
 
 
 
Dáil Eireann 
 
Bank of Ireland (2), 
Coca Cola/Robert 
Roberts, European 
Commission, Mayo 
County Council, 
Sunmount Services 
 
In five AM cases, the fraudster appeared to have no regard for the crime 
committed. In one case the fraudster continued to defraud the organisation even 
after the fraud had been initially discovered and in the other case the fraudster 
apologised for the crime but he made little attempt to pay back the money owed 
and attended the court hearing in a new car. In the third case, the agents felt that 
the fraud would not hurt the companies as they were large companies, even 
though in this case the losses severely negatively affected one of the companies 
defrauded and it had to cease trading. In two cases the fraudsters appeared to 
diminish the seriousness of the fraud. In one case the employee was discovered to 
be falsely claiming travel expenses but felt that “bigger fish had gotten away with 
greater crimes” (Irish Times 26/11/11). In the other case the fraudster felt the 
fraud was facilitated by a gap in procedure and therefore only warranted a 
reprimand. 
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The examples given in ISA 240 were not sufficient to cover all of the attitudes 
towards fraud reported in the AM cases. The findings of this research advise that 
the examples given in ISA 240 should be extended to include a sense of 
entitlement and no apparent regard for the crime. These attitude/rationalisation 
show the fraudsters to neither understand nor care for the implications of the 
frauds on others, and these types of attitudes should be red-flags to auditors if they 
discover such attitudes on an audit. 
 
6.5.2 Subjective Norms in ISA 240 
 
Subjective norms are where the belief that those who are important to you, 
including colleagues, would approve or disapprove of the fraud behaviour. The 
two cases where subjective norms were identified involved the fraudsters alluding 
to others (who were not convicted) as complicit in the fraud. These are shown in 
Table 6.7.This is not present in ISA 240.   
 
Table 6.7: Subjective Norms not present in ISA 240 
Element of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour 
Examples NOT present 
in ISA 240 
Companies Involved  
Subjective norms Complicity in 
undertaking the fraud 
Whelan Group, D Floyd  
 
 
In the FFR case where fraudulent accounts receivable details were used to get 
invoice discounting, the judge felt that the fraudster could not have acted alone 
and more senior members of staff must have been involved. However, no other 
convictions were made in this case. In another case the fraudster believed he was 
the “fall guy for more sinister elements who benefitted from the [fraudulent] 
scheme” (Irish Times 25/05/12). These subjective norms were not present in ISA 
240 and the researcher advises that the examples given in the standard should be 
extended to include them. Where there is complicity in the undertaking of a fraud, 
this makes it more difficult for an auditor to discover, as there is more than one 
person involved in the cover up of the crime.  
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6.5.3 Perceived Behavioural Controls in ISA 240 
 
Perceived behaviour control relates to the experience of a person and anticipation 
of impediments and obstacles based on their experience, competence and any 
expected obstacles they might face. Perceived behavioural controls generally 
relate to influence over the person by another. Two cases had a perceived 
behavioural control reported in the press and this was not present in ISA 240 (see 
Table 6.8).  
 
Table 6.8: Perceived Behavioural Controls not present in ISA 240 
Element of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour 
Examples NOT present 
in ISA 240 
Companies Involved  
Perceived behavioural 
controls 
Weak Personality/easily 
lead 
 
Lack of business 
knowledge 
Bank of Ireland (3) 
 
 
Professional Door Staff 
Limited 
 
In one case a bank employee tried to take sick leave rather than carry out the 
fraud, however he was a "very weak individual who is easily lead" (Irish Times 
17/3/09) and he let himself be pressurised by criminal elements. Both the attitudes 
towards fraud and the perceived behaviour control elements indicate examples 
where the fraud may have been a deliberate act from the start and the character of 
the employee is in question. In the final case, the directors claimed that their lack 
of business knowledge, and therefore an inability to keep proper books and 
records, was the reason for the fraud. Normally it is assumed that the fraud begins 
accidentally however the character of the employee and their excusing fraudulent 
behaviour should also be included in ISA 240. 
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6.5.4 Moral Obligations in ISA 240 
 
Moral obligation is where behaviour is considered ethical and moral by the 
fraudsters in the circumstance, for example fraudsters can lessen their feeling of 
guilt if they believe their actions are helping others. The eight instances of moral 
obligation identified in this study, as divided in this study into three categories, 
were not present in any of the examples given by ISA 240 (see Table 6.9 below). 
 
Table 6.9: Moral Obligations not present in ISA 240 
Element of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour 
Examples NOT present 
in ISA 240 
Companies Involved  
Moral obligation Action for the good of 
the company/department 
 
 
 
Charitable actions : for 
the good of others 
 
 
To pay back previous 
frauds 
AJH Construction, 
Begley Brothers Limited, 
Bovale Development, 
Galway County Council,  
 
Bank of Ireland (2), 
EBS/Musgrave/C&C, 
Revenue Commissioners 
 
Celerity Fluid Systems, 
 
 
In eight reported cases the fraudsters manipulated the system and committed a 
fraud as they believed the action was for the good of their department, their 
company or of others. There were four cases of action for the good of the 
company/department where the directors felt they were performing the taxation 
fraud for the benefit of the company and not for themselves. In one case all of the 
money in the VAT fraud was invested back into the business. In the fourth case a 
councillor, who got council staff to work on his own property, rationalised the 
behaviour by stating it was to maintain the council’s budget in future years. In 
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three cases the fraudster undertook the fraud for the good of others. In one such 
case the fraudster stated that she was not even aware that she was acting illegally 
when she gave extra tax credits to friends. In another case the fraudster owned her 
own company, which was failing and she did not wish to leave her staff go. In 
another case the fraudster wanted to give one friend an increase in their tax 
allowances and another friend an overdraft and in another the fraudster didn’t 
want her own staff to lose their jobs. In the final fraud case, the fraudster used the 
proceeds of a fraud to repay another employer who she had previously defrauded. 
Undertaking a fraud for the benefit of the company or undertaking fraud as a 
charitable act or carrying out a fraud to pay back others were not present in ISA 
240.  
 
There are no examples of moral obligation present in ISA 240. The auditing 
standard needs to be more comprehensive and expanded to include examples 
where the fraud is carried out to help the organisation and others or to pay back 
for previous frauds committed as determined from this research. When a fraudster 
believes that they are undertaking a fraud for the benefit of the company or of 
others then it will be more difficult to convince the fraudster of the act undertaken 
as being wrong. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter compared the content of the press reports of occupational fraud in 
Ireland from 2002 to 2013 to the examples of red-flags presented in ISA 240. It 
found  although the “opportunities” element of fraud is adequately covered in ISA 
240 at present, the “pressures” and “attitude/rationalisation” elements are not. 
Five additions to incentive/pressure in the auditing standard were recommended 
based on the findings of the current study. These are: a lavish lifestyle, pressure 
from criminals, greed, depression and   concern for others.   
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The findings suggested that the elements of the TPB framework should be used to 
expand the examples given for the attitude/rationalisation element. Under 
“attitude towards fraud” it is recommended that examples of sense of entitlement 
and no apparent regard for the crime committed be added. Under “subjective 
norms,” it recommended that an example where the fraudster considers that others 
would approve of the fraud should be included in the auditing standard. The 
perceived behavioural control of a weak personality should also be included in the 
auditing standard. Moral obligations, where the fraudster considers the fraud to be 
carried out to help the organisation or others or to repay previous frauds, should 
also be included as an example in the auditing standard.  
 
If these suggestions are included in the auditing standards, the ability of the 
auditing standards to detect extant Irish occupational fraud could be significantly 
improved. The awareness of these examples to auditing professionals and the 
management of organisations could encourage them to notice attitudes and traits 
in employees which may suggest fraudulent activity. The more cases are taken 
against occupational fraudsters, the more incentive/pressure, opportunities and 
attitude/rationalisation of fraudsters will be revealed. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions of this Research 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Cohen et al. (2010) used a FT/TPB framework, combining the Fraud Triangle (FT) 
and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to examine the unethical behaviour of 
managers from 1992-2005 in thirty-nine reported fraud cases in the US. They 
suggested that SAS 996 the auditing standard in the US, could be strengthened by the 
inclusion of additional examples of fraud risk factors identified from their research. 
They called for similar research in other jurisdictions. This study is an answer to this 
calling, to substantiate the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context, and also 
to examine why conviction rates are low in Ireland. 
 
The objective of this study is: 
 
Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for, occupational 
fraud in Ireland? 
 
This objective will be achieved by answering the following questions in this chapter: 
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of extant 
occupational fraud in Ireland? 
2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland? 
 
To answer these questions, the researcher used content analysis of the press articles 
reporting occupational fraud in the twelve year period from January 2002 and 
December 2013.  This period was used as it is followed the introduction of the 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. This chapter closes with a 
discussion of the limitation of this research and recommendations for future research. 
                                                 
6 As previously stated the US stated the equivalent of ISA 240 is SAS 99 “Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit.” There are only minor differences in the text of the two auditing standards. 
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7.2 Sufficiency of ISA 240 
 
This section analyses the content of the press reports and the auditing standard to 
answer the first research question posed.  
 
Question 1: Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the 
breadth of extant occupational fraud in Ireland? 
 
The majority of the reported incidents of fraud in Ireland were relatable to the FT/TPB 
framework. Of the thirty-five cases examined, thirty-one provided at least one 
“incentive/pressure” on the fraudster that could have led to the committing of the 
fraud in the press reports. It should be noted that the press reports were made by court 
reporters and the lack of reporting of an incentive/pressure does not mean that they did 
not exist, just that perhaps this aspect was not worthy of reporting. The “opportunity” 
to commit fraud was in the press reports of all thirty-five cases in this study. As noted 
in the literature review, opportunities for fraud occur when there is a lack of internal 
control. This is the element of the fraud triangle over which the company should have 
control. Twenty-four of the thirty-five cases studied had at least one 
“attitude/rationalisation” included in the press report. A number of the twenty-four 
cases reported multiple rationalisations that lead to thirty-one instances of 
rationalisations in the study. Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) the 
“attitude/rationalisation” element is divided into four categories; “attitude towards 
fraud”, “subjective norms”, “perceived behavioural controls” and “moral 
obligation”, provides more insight into the rationalisation of fraud. In this study there 
were nineteen instances of “attitude towards fraud”, two of “subjective norms”, two of 
“perceived behavioural controls” and eight instances of “moral obligations.” Three 
potential reasons for the non-recording of attitude/rationalisation in the press reports 
could be that the press reporter simply did not think it newsworthy, it is internal to the 
fraudster so it may not have been discussed in the court case or if the person were a 
serial fraudster, he/she would require no rationalisation to undertake the fraudulent 
action.  
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ISA 240 “The Auditors responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial 
statements” is the auditing standard used by auditors in Ireland to get guidance on the 
detection of fraud. It suggests red flags, by way of examples, that auditors may face in 
a broad range of situations, to fulfil their duty in an audit of financial statements.  
 
When comparing the elements of the FT/TPB framework reported in the press reports 
of the Irish occupational fraud cases to the examples given in ISA 240, it was found 
that some of the elements were not present in the auditing standard. This confirms in 
an Irish context the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) that the existing auditing standard 
needs to be expanded. Of the thirty-five Irish cases examined only seventeen reported 
an incentive/pressure which is presented in ISA 240, all thirty-five recorded 
opportunities were present in ISA 240, and only thirteen of twenty-four cases which 
recorded attitude/rationalisation could be matched to the examples given in ISA 240. 
The elements that were present in the auditing standard are summarised in Appendix B 
to this study. It should be noted that the elements of some of the cases could be 
matched to multiple examples presented in ISA 240. However, more interestingly for 
this study, it is apparent that some of the elements of the Irish cases were not present 
in the auditing standard. Table 7.1 presents the additional examples that should be 
added to the existing auditing standard to improve it adequacy. As not all instances of 
fraud are captured in the red-flags as presented in the ISA 240, this also confirms the 
findings of Krambia-Kardis, 2002 Bierstaker et al., 2006 and Glodstein, 2009, who 
warn against over reliance on red-flags, which could lead to the ignoring of other 
indicators of fraud. 
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Table 7.1 Recommended additions to ISA 240  
Element of the FT/TPB Not present in ISA 240 
 
Incentives/pressurea 
 
1. Lavish lifestyle (PIC) 
2. Greed 
3. Pressure from criminals 
4. Depression 
5. Concern for others (PIC) 
6. Paying back others previously defrauded 
 
 
Attitudes/rationalisations 
(Reasons given by the 
fraudsters) 
 
Attitude towards Fraud 
1. Sense of entitlement 
2. No apparent regards for crime concerned to make 
amends 
 
Subjective Norms 
3. Complicity in undertaking the fraud (PIC) 
 
Perceived Behavioural Controls 
4. Weak personality/easily lead (PIC) 
5. Lack of business knowledge 
 
Moral Obligation 
6. Action for the good of the company/department 
7. Charitable actions : for the good of others (PIC) 
8. To pay back previous frauds  
 
Key – PIC – Present in the research compiled by Cohen et al. (2010)
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7.2.1 Additional Incentives/Pressures 
 
This study confirms that two further examples of the incentives/ pressures that 
Cohen et al. (2010) suggested should be added to the US auditing standard, could 
also be added to ISA 240. The first is “maintenance of a high standard of living.” 
This was present in nine of the thirty-six Irish fraud cases. In ISA 240 the risk 
factor “personal financial obligations” is used, which suggests the fraudster is 
motivated to cover financial debts or losses incurred. “Maintenance of a high 
standard of living” would not necessarily be included in this, as it is a situation 
where the fraudsters make a choice to live beyond their means. These results 
confirm the results of Paternoster and Mazerolle (1994) and Broidy (2001) A 
further incentive/pressure noted by Cohen et al. (2010), and confirmed by this 
study, is “charitable causes/helping others”. This was reported in three of the Irish 
cases where fraud was committed to help others, sometimes without the 
knowledge of the other person.  
 
As well as confirming the need to add these two incentive/pressure, this study 
found three further incentive/pressure, which were not present in ISA 240 (or in 
Cohen et al.’s (2010) findings). They are “greed,” “pressure from criminals” and 
“depression.” The FT and ISA 240 are predicated on the belief that fraud starts by 
accident and it then become habitual. However, in two of the Irish cases examined 
the only motivating factor reported for fraudsters committing fraud was greed. In 
another case a fraudster was put under pressure from criminals to carry out fraud 
against the company in which he worked. In two cases, the fraudsters’ depression 
was the reason given for committing the fraud. Accordingly, as well as Cohen et 
al.’s (2010) two additions, these three additions would improve how 
representative the auditing standard is of the extant incentive/pressure in an Irish 
context. 
 
Three additional incentive/pressure identified by Cohen et al. (2010), namely 
“reputation at stake,” “influence of managers on others” and “prize given” were 
not found in any of the Irish cases. All of the cases in Cohen et al.’s (2010) study 
involved Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) in large listed organisations where 
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stock options and managerial bonuses were of concern. Whereas in this study of 
thirty-five Irish occupational fraud cases, only six involved FFR and it was mainly 
in owner-managed or small to medium enterprises (SMEs). The issue of share 
price was therefore irrelevant in the Irish cases. Even though these additions are 
not found in the extant Irish fraud cases, they should be taken into consideration if 
the auditing standard is to be reviewed. 
 
7.2.2 Opportunity 
 
Similar to the findings of Cohen et al. (2010), all opportunities reported in this 
study were present in ISA 240. As stated earlier, the cases examined by Cohen et 
al. (2010) were large quoted companies and the frauds were undertaken by senior 
management. The opportunities identified by Cohen et al. (2010), which were not 
seen in the cases in this study, included significant related party transactions, an 
ability to dominate industry, highly complex transactions and ineffective boards 
of management and audit committees. This study only shares one of the 
opportunities found in Cohen et al.’s (2010) study, that of “domination of 
management by a single person or a small group without compensating controls” 
(ISA 240). This was the opportunity present in all the FFR cases of this study. The 
opportunities in this study found in the AM cases were “large amounts of cash”, 
“inadequate internal controls”, ”inadequate oversight of senior management of 
expenditure”, “inadequate segregation of duties”, “inadequate system of 
authorisation and approval” and “inadequate management understanding of 
information technology” (ISA240). The auditing standard has adequately covered 
all of the opportunities reported in the Irish cases in this study. 
 
7.2.3 Additional Attitudes/Rationalisations 
 
Cohen et al. (2010) used the TPB to expand the attitude/rationalisation element 
of fraud cases to include attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived 
behaviour controls and moral obligations to identify elements not present in the 
auditing standard. A similar analysis was conducted as part of the study.  
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Under “attitude towards fraud,” Cohen et al. (2010) identified two 
rationalisations of fraud not present in the US auditing standard. Those were 
“maintaining a high living standard” and “reputation at stake.” “Reputation at 
stake” was not found in the Irish cases. “Maintaining a high living standard” was 
found, but the researcher felt it was more appropriate to include this as an 
incentive/pressure, rather than being seen as an attitude towards fraud. This study 
identifies a further two attitudes towards fraud as suggested additions to the 
auditing standard: a sense of entitlement and no apparent regard for crime 
committed. In the case of a politician convicted of submitting fraudulent 
expenses, the judge felt the fraudster conveyed a sense of entitlement by assuming 
that just because these expenses were sanctioned, he should get them. No apparent 
regard for the crime committed was reported in five of the cases. In one of these 
cases the fraudster felt the companies were large and could afford the loss, and 
another fraudster continued committing fraud even after it was discovered. One of 
the fraudsters turned up to court in a brand new car having made no attempt at 
restitution, one of the fraudsters felt that others who had carried out more 
“serious” crimes had gone unpunished and finally one of the fraudsters believed 
that his crime did not warrant much punishment. 
 
Under “subjective norms” Cohen et al. (2010) identified “influence of 
management” and “complicity” as two suggested additions to the US auditing 
standard. The “influence of managers” was not found in the current study, 
however the requirement of an addition of an example of “complicity” was 
confirmed in six of the Irish cases. In four reported cases more than one fraudster 
was convicted. In the other two cases an accomplice was alluded to, but only one 
fraudster was convicted. 
 
Under “perceived behavioural controls” Cohen et al. (2010) suggested two 
additions to the auditing standard. These were “receiving a prize or superlative” 
and “the personality of the manager.” There were no extant Irish cases of 
receiving a prize or superlatives in the cases examined in the current study. This 
study does suggest however that “personality” should be added to the auditing 
standard, especially if it was weak and the person could be easily influenced. In 
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one case the judge stated that the fraudster had a weak personality based on the 
fact that he allowed himself to be influenced by criminals. This study also 
suggested the inclusion of “no business knowledge” as an addition to the auditing 
standard. This was present in a case where the directors used their lack of business 
knowledge as a rationale for carrying out the fraud.  
 
Under “moral obligation” Cohen et al. (2010) identified “actions for the good of 
the company” as a rationalisation which was in the US cases but not present in the 
relevant auditing standard. This study confirmed that this was also used as a 
rationalisation in four of the study cases where fraud was carried out for the good 
of the company. In one case, the fraudster ploughed the proceeds of the fraud back 
into the business. In two cases the tax (excise duty and PAYE/PRSI) was thought 
to be unjust. In the final case the fraudster suggested that the council would get a 
smaller budget next year if the fraud was not committed. Cohen et al. (2010) also 
identified “charitable causes” as a rationalisation not present in the auditing 
standards. This was identified in three Irish cases in this study, where the fraud 
did not benefit the fraudster, but benefitted family and friends by way of tax 
allowances and authorising an overdraft. This was not present in ISA 240. As well 
as recommending the addition of these two as examples in ISA 240, an additional 
rationalisation of moral obligations was found in this study, where the fraudster 
rationalised the fraud as the money was used to repay a previous fraud. 
 
The auditing standard already provides many red flags for an auditor to consider. 
As not all of the elements of these cases are covered by the examples given in the 
auditing standard, the findings of this study suggest that the standard should be 
expanded to provide a more comprehensive list of examples. It suggests the 
addition of maintenance of lavish lifestyles, charitable causes, greed, pressure 
from criminals and depression in the incentives for committing fraud. It suggests 
the addition of a sense of entitlement, no apparent regard for crime, complicity, 
weak personality, no business knowledge, actions for the good of the company, 
charitable causes and repayment of previous frauds as examples of rationalisation 
of fraud (see Appendix C). Some of these were confirmation of the findings of 
Cohen et al. (2010) and others are further examples identified by the researcher in 
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this study. Undeniably, it would be very difficult to provide an exhaustive list of 
all circumstances under which fraud is undertaken, but by using the FT/TPB 
framework a number of new examples are suggested here that cover the extant 
Irish cases over the twelve year study period and since the new laws were 
introduced in 2001. 
 
7.3 Difficulties in Bringing a Conviction for Fraud in Ireland 
 
This section used the analysis of the extant press report to answer the second 
research question posed. 
 
Question 2: Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland? 
 
The extant literature discussed a number of difficulties in identifying and 
convicting fraud cases as depicted in Figure 7.1. The main reasons identified in 
the literature review for these difficulties were; multifarious definitions of fraud; 
status of the fraudster; difficulty to detect; advances in technology, law and 
auditing standards not keeping pace, organisations not pursuing cases of fraud and 
not all frauds are accidental. 
 
This study confirms the difficulty recounted in extant literature of the multifarious 
definitions and methods of fraud. This study using the auditing standard’s 
categorisation of occupational fraud into Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) 
and Asset Misappropriation (AM), divided the thirty-five cases in this study into 
six FFR and twenty-nine AM cases. Even though only six of the thirty-five cases 
studied were FFR, the total value of these cases was 66% of the value of the 
frauds committed. These findings support the findings of Beasley et al. (1999) 
who found the value of FFR greatly exceeded that of AR. 
 
 There were fourteen methods of fraudulent activity, four FFR, and ten AM. These 
methods ranged from fraudulent taxation return, false invoicing, false expense and 
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overtime claim to forging ownership documentation. The number of different 
methods used to defraud in the cases examined illustrates the multifarious 
definitions and methods of fraud. This study only looked at occupational fraud so 
frauds such as identity theft, card skimming and false representation were not 
examined.  
 
Figure 7.1 Difficulties in convicting fraud in the current study 
 
  
The proposition in the extant literature that a fraudster is likely to be of high status 
in the company and to be in top management is borne out in this research. 
Because of their seniority in the organisation, others in the company may not 
report suspected fraud for fear of retribution. All the FFR cases in the study were 
carried out by company directors. The majority of the AR cases were also carried 
out by senior management. The vast majority of the Irish cases involved small to 
medium sized owner-managed businesses and would not have audit committees as 
prescribed by best corporate governance practice. The one on top is very 
important in these organisations. If it appears that management are partaking in, or 
lenient on fraudulent activity, then the other employees may feel that fraudulent 
activity is acceptable.  
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The extant literature emphasised that the secretive nature of fraud often makes it 
difficult to detect. Even if a company knows that funds are gone, it is often 
difficult to detect and quantify the value of the fraud. In this study, the method of 
detecting fraud was mentioned in seventeen press reports, see table 7.1 below. 
 
Table 7.2: Method of fraud detection noted in Irish fraud cases 
Detection Method 
Value of Fraud 
€ 
Number of 
Cases 
Not Reported 14,984,615 18 
Internal controls 3,252,385 10 
Suppliers complaint 600,000 1 
Whistle-blower 224,000 2 
Tax Audit (threat) 135,000 1 
IT System  40,000 1 
Reporter 30,000 1 
External Audit 17,000 1 
Grand Total €19,283,000 35 
 
An internal control was the method of detection recorded in ten of the cases. In 
two frauds uncovered by internal controls new personnel in a department noticed 
anomalies and investigated the source. In another case, the fraudster was receiving 
exceptionally high levels of overtime. In another case, the fraud was detected 
when a manager noticed that the takings for the night for one section of the 
business consisted of just vouchers with no cash. In another case, the management 
was concerned that the revenue from a section had fallen and looked for it to be 
investigated by an external auditor. In one case, a supplier was no longer getting 
contracts and wanted an explanation. In two cases a whistle-blower made a 
complaint, one came as a tip off from a previous co-worker and the other was a 
man who found cheques with the company name in his daughter-in-law’s house. 
In one case, a notice of a tax audit prompted the fraudster to confess. In the case 
of an employee who gave his girlfriend an unauthorised overdraft, the company’s 
IT system flagged this as an unusual transaction. A freedom of information (FOI) 
request by a reporter caused the fraud to be uncovered in the case of the councillor 
who had council employees carry out work on his property. In only one case, 
where the fraudster stole a cheque book, was the fraud uncovered by an external 
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auditor. In the cases of FFR, the fraud was undertaken by the directors/owners of 
the businesses who were in a position to override the internal controls of the 
organisations. Although it was not reported, it is most likely that these were 
uncovered by a Revenue Commissioner investigation. ISA 240 reiterates that it is 
the directors of a company that are primarily responsible for the safeguarding of 
assets of the company and that the auditor only has secondary responsibility and it 
is not expected that an audit would detect fraud.  
 
The methods used for undertaking the frauds are included in tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
The specific use of technology was not recorded in the press reports of the cases 
but technology was used in the cases of the unauthorised overdraft limit given to a 
girlfriend, the use of a supervisors’ password to authorise payments and 
unauthorised transfers to the fraudsters accounts. The subject of this research, 
occupational fraud cases, would not cover any outside cyber-attacks. The use of 
technology should be an important part of efforts to detect and protect from fraud. 
 
Difficulties in securing a conviction for fraud could also be due to the fact that the 
law and auditing standards are not keeping pace with advances in methodologies 
of committing fraud. The law in relation to fraud in Ireland has not been amended 
since 2001 and ISA 240 has been in place since 2004. The auditing standards 
should be reviewed to include the elements of the TPB framework and include the 
examples of fraudulent behaviour noted in the Irish cases studied, that are not 
included in ISA 240. 
 
Eircom is the only Irish Public Limited Company (PLC) in which an occupational 
fraud case was identified for this study. As noted in Chapter four, Greencore PLC 
did prosecute a case of occupational fraud, however this was pursued in Scotland 
so this was not included in this study. The Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (2014) noted the reasons for non-pursuit of fraudsters vary from fear of 
bad publicity, internal punishment deemed sufficient, private settlement reached 
with the fraudster and criminal action deemed too costly to pursue.  
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The prosecution of fraud cases appears to be inadequate. There were two press 
reports of cases not included in this study where civil cases had been taken against 
fraudsters, instead of criminal cases, as the time taken by the Gardaí to bring a 
criminal case was deemed too long. These cases were not included in the study as 
the outcome of the cases was not publically recorded. It is difficult to know if 
these are the only cases. The Anglo Irish Bank collapsed in 2007 and the first 
attempted prosecutions did not take place until 2014. The Gardaí and the Director 
of Corporate Enforcement have reported that they do not have the technical skills 
or the resources to investigate fraud (Brady, 2014). In two of the cases examined 
the fraud was undertaken by serial fraudsters who were only pursued after they 
had defrauded a number of employers. Perhaps if organisations took a zero 
tolerance policy and pursued prosecutions the cost of fraud might reduce. 
 
The capability of the fraudsters is another difficulty encountered when looking for 
a fraud conviction. Sutherland (1940) and Cressey (1950) assumed that the fraud 
begins when the fraudster has an un-shareable financial obligation. In the original 
FT it is expected that fraud is carried out in the first instance by accident with 
more recent research exploring the concept of the predatory fraudster. Predatory 
fraudsters only need opportunity to commit a fraud (Walters and Geyer, 2004; 
Wolfe and Hernanson, 2004, Perri, 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010; Kransher et al., 
2011). The researcher believes that there was a serial fraudster, who perpetrated 
fraud on a number of organisations, in two of the cases in this study. One of the 
fraudsters committed fraud against two organisations and the other targeted three 
employers. There were also a number of cases in the study where fraud was 
committed through collusion. Most of the fraud theories and the auditing 
standards are based on a fraudster working alone and the fraud had not been 
started deliberately. The auditing standard should be expanded to include 
instances of the predatory fraudster and of collusion.  
 
The inadequacy of the auditing standard is not the only reason why the number of 
convictions for occupational fraud is low. This study finds the multifarious 
methods of committing fraud, the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting 
fraud, advances in technology, law not keeping pace, reluctance by organisations 
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to report fraud, and that predatory fraudsters target organisations and therefore not 
all frauds are accidental, as factors keeping the conviction rate for occupational 
fraud so low in Ireland. 
 
7.4 Limitations of this Research 
 
This exploratory descriptive research, while narrowing the existing gap in the 
literature, has limitations. In fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters in 
Business (Research), this dissertation was the first major piece of academic 
research undertaken by the researcher. Along with experience, time was another 
limiting factor for the researcher. This resulted in the time framework stopping in 
December 2013. This research was undertaken by one person, so unlike the Cohen 
et al. (2010) study, there was not another researcher verifying the coding of the 
categorisation of the fraudulent activities. However in Cohen et al. (2010) the 
second researcher did not find significant errors in the coding of the original 
researcher, so it is unlikely that this was a factor in the current study.  
 
The research was undertaken using newspaper articles reporting on occupational 
fraud. Newspapers may wish to sensationalise fraud cases and create dramatic 
stories to boost circulation. However, the press articles were based on court 
proceedings and were based on facts and testimonials presented in the cases and 
judges’ comments. In this study care was taken to focus on the facts of the case 
and ignore journalistic opinions. While the reports of the cases used are from 
court proceedings the elements of incentive/pressure and attitude/rationalisation 
were not included in all of the reports and the findings of the research could have 
been expanded had this information been available. The number of occupational 
fraud cases identified in the research was thirty-five, but it must be noted that the 
press may not have reported all cases of occupational fraud convicted in Ireland 
during the time researched.  
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7.5 Future Research  
This research answered the call of Cohen et al. (2010) to extend the scope of their 
study to investigate cases of fraud using the FT/TPB framework in territories 
outside of the US. It confirmed the findings of their study that further examples of 
red flags should be added to the auditing standards, particularly through expansion 
of the attitudes/rationalisation element of the auditing standards to include attitude 
towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral 
obligation. It would be interesting to compare these findings with other territories 
such as the UK or other European countries. In addition, a longitudinal study 
could be undertaken to examine the content of press reports of Irish fraud cases in 
ten years’ time to determine if any new elements would be identified, perhaps 
relating to advances in technology and cybercrime. 
 
None of the Irish occupational fraud cases identified in this research were of fraud 
in Irish PLC’s. It would be interesting to investigate the reason for this. The small 
number of cases identified in the research would suggest that there are only 
limited amounts of fraud cases pursued through the legal system. The reason for 
this perceived lack of prosecution could also be investigated. 
 
Another area for further research could be the methods of discovering fraud as 
there was only limited reporting of these in the press reports. As the most 
significant suggested additions to the auditing standard relate to the 
attitudes/rationalisation section of the audit triangle further research could be 
undertaken to assess the auditor’s view of the usefulness of the FT/TPB 
framework.  
Another area for further research could be the lack of resources in the Gardai and 
the office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and how the lack of given 
resources affect the number of fraud cases prosecuted in Ireland. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
Previous research called for more research into occupational fraud. This study 
attempts to answer this calling by describing and analysing the reported cases of 
occupational fraud in Ireland from 2002 to 2013. The results of this dissertation 
confirm the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) that the auditing standards could be 
strengthened by using the elements of the FT/TPB framework. In doing this, ISA 
240 could be expanded to include more examples of fraudulent activity. It 
confirms that more examples of incentives and attitude toward the fraud, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral obligation should be 
included in the auditing standard. 
 
This study also explored why it is difficult to bring a conviction for occupational 
fraud in Ireland. The study found the multifarious methods of committing fraud, 
the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting fraud, advances in technology, 
law not keeping pace, reluctance by organisations to report fraud, and the fact that 
not all frauds are accidental, are factors in keeping the conviction rate for 
occupational fraud so low in Ireland. 
 
It is important that the professional standards and the resources of those charged 
with prosecuting fraud are strengthened to give further insight into occupational 
fraud. The difficulties in convicting fraud should also be considered by those 
tasked with safeguarding organisations assets. This should lead to a reduction in 
the effects of occupational fraud in organisations and in wider society. 
 
 
  
121 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: ISA 240 Examples of Fraud7  
 
Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Incentives/ 
pressures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, 
industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or as 
indicated by): 
 High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins 
 High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes 
in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates  
 Significant declines in customer demand and 
increasing business failures in either the industry or 
overall economy 
 Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, 
foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent  
 Recurring negative cash flows from operations or 
an inability to generate cash flow from operations 
while reporting earnings and earnings growth 
 Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially 
compared to that of other companies in the same 
industry 
 New accounting, statutory, or regulatory 
requirements 
Excessive pressure exists for management to meet  the 
requirements or expectations of third parties due to the 
following: 
 Profitability or trend level expectations of investment 
analysis, institutional investors, significant creditors, 
or other external parties (particularly expectations 
that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), including 
expectations created by management in, for example, 
overly optimistic press releases or annual report 
messages 
 Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to 
stay competitive – including financing or major 
                                                 
7 Highlighted areas are examples found in the research of convicted Irish Fraud (2002-2013) 
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Incentives/ 
Pressures 
research and development or capital expenditure 
 Marginal ability to meet exchange listing 
requirements or debt repayments or other debt 
covenant requirements 
 Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor 
financial results on significant pending transactions, 
such as business combinations or contract awards 
Information available indicates that the personal financial 
situation of management or those charged with governance 
is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising 
from the following: 
 Significant financial interest in the entity 
 Significant portions of their compensation (for 
example, bonuses, stock options, and earn-out 
arrangements) being contingent upon achieving 
aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, 
financial position, or cash flows 
 Personal guarantees of debt of the entity 
There is excessive pressure on management or operating 
personnel to meet financial targets established by those 
charged with governance, including sales or profitability 
incentive goals  
 
Opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides 
opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial reporting that 
can arise from the following: 
 Significant related-party transactions not in the 
ordinary course of business or with related entities 
not audited or audited by other firms 
 A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a 
certain industry sector that allows the entity to dictate 
terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that 
may result in inappropriate o non-arm’s-length 
transactions 
 Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on 
significant estimates that involve subjective, 
judgements or uncertainties that are difficult to 
corroborate 
 Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially those close to period end that pose difficult 
“substance over form” questions 
 Significant operations located or conducted across 
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunities 
international borders in jurisdictions where differing 
business environments and cultures exist 
 Use of business intermediaries for which there 
appears to be no clear business justifications 
 Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch 
operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which there 
appears to be no clear business justification 
The monitoring of management is not effective as a result of 
the following: 
 Domination of management by a single person or 
small group (in a non-owner managed business) 
without compensating controls 
 Oversight by those charged with governance over the 
financial reporting process and internal control is not 
effective 
There is a complex or unstable organisational structure, as 
evidenced by the following 
 Difficulty in determining the organization or 
individuals that have controlling interest in the entity 
 Overly complex organisational structure involving 
unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority 
 High turnover of senior management, legal counsel, 
or those charged with governance 
Internal control components are deficient as a result of the 
following: 
Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated 
controls and controls over interim financial reporting (where 
external reporting is required) 
High turnover rates in employment of accounting, internal 
audit, or information technology standards that are not 
effective 
Accounting and information systems that are not effective, 
including situations involving significant deficiencies in 
internal control 
Attitudes/ 
Rationalisations 
 
 
 
 Communication, implementation, support, or 
enforcement of the entity’s values or ethical 
standards by management, or the communication of 
inappropriate values or ethical standards, that are not 
effective 
 Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation 
in or preoccupation with the selection of accounting 
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes/ 
Rationalisations 
 
 
policies or the determination of significant estimates 
 Known history of violations of securities laws or 
other laws and regulations, or claims against the 
entity, its senior management, or those charged with 
governance alleging fraud or violations of laws and 
regulations 
 Excessive interest by management in maintaining or 
increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend 
 The practice by management of committing to 
analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve 
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts 
 Management failing to remedy known significant 
deficiencies in internal control on a timely basis 
 An interest by management in employing 
inappropriate means to minimise reported 
earnings for tax-motivated reasons 
 Low morale among senior management 
 The owner-manager makes no distinction between 
personal and business transactions 
 Dispute between shareholders in a closely held entity 
 Recurring attempts by management to justify 
marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis of 
materiality 
The relationship between management and the current or 
predecessor auditor is strained, as exhibited by the 
following: 
 Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor 
auditor on accounting, auditing, or reported matters 
 Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as 
unrealistic time constraints regarding the completion 
of the audit or the issuance of the auditors’ report 
 Restrictions in the auditor that inappropriately limit 
access to people of information or the ability to 
communicate effectively with those charged with 
governance 
 Domineering management behaviour in dealing with 
the auditor, especially involving attempts to 
influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the 
selection or continuance of personnel assigned to or 
consulted on the audit engagement 
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Risk factors arising from misstatements arising from Misappropriation of Assets 
Incentives/ 
Pressures 
 
Personal financial obligations may create pressure on 
management or employees with access to cash or other assets 
susceptible to theft to misappropriate those assets 
 
Adverse relationships between the entity and employees 
with access to cash or other assets susceptible to theft may 
motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For 
example, adverse relationships may be created by the 
following: 
 Known or anticipated future employee layoffs 
 Recent or anticipated changes to employee 
compensation or benefit plans 
 Promotions, compensation or other rewards inconsistent 
with expectations 
Opportunities  
Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the 
susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. For example, 
opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following: 
 Large amounts of cash on hand or processed 
 Inventory items that are small in size, of high value or in 
high demand 
 Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, 
diamonds or computer chips 
 Fixed assets which are small in size, marketable, or 
lacking observable identification of ownership 
 
Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the 
susceptibility of misappropriation of those assets. For example, 
misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following: 
 Inadequate segregation of duties or independent 
checks 
 Inadequate oversight of senior management 
expenditures, such as travel and other re-
imbursements 
 Inadequate management oversight of employees 
responsible for assets, for example, inadequate 
supervision or monitoring of remote locations 
 Inadequate job applicant screening of employees with 
access to assets 
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Risk factors arising from misstatements arising from Misappropriation of Assets 
 Inadequate record keeping with respect to assets 
 Inadequate system of authorisation and approval of 
transactions (for example, in purchasing) 
 Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, 
inventory or fixed assets 
 Lack of complete and timely reconciliations of assets 
 Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of 
transactions, for example merchandise returns  
 Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing 
key control functions 
 Inadequate management understanding of 
information technology, which enables information 
technology employees to perpetrate a 
misappropriation 
 Inadequate access controls over automated records, 
including controls over and review of computer systems 
event logs 
Attitude/ 
Rationalisation 
 Disregard for the need for monitoring or reducing risks 
related to misappropriations of assets 
 Disregard for internal control over misappropriation 
of assets by overriding existing controls or by failing 
to take appropriate remedial action on known 
deficiencies in internal control 
 Behaviour indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction 
with the entity or its treatment of the employee 
 Changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may indicate 
assets have been misappropriated 
 Tolerance of petty theft 
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Appendix B Elements of Irish fraud cases included in ISA 240  
 
Element of the 
FT/TPB 
Elements from Irish fraud cases present in ISA 240 
Incentives/ 
pressures 
1. Significant financial interest in the entity (PIC) 
2. Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an 
inability to generate cash flows from operations while 
reporting earnings and earnings growth 
3. Personal financial obligations (PIC) 
4. Adverse relationship between entity and employees with 
access to assets (layoffs) 
Opportunities 1. Domination of management by a single person without 
compensating controls (PIC) 
2. Large amounts of cash on hand or processed 
3. Inadequate internal control over assets 
4. Inadequate oversight of senior management expenditure, 
such as travel and other re-imbursements. 
5. Inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks 
6. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of 
transactions 
7. Inadequate management understanding of information 
technology 
Attitudes/ 
Rationalisations 
1. An interest by management in employing inappropriate 
means to minimise reported earnings for tax-motivated 
reasons 
2. The owner-manager makes no distinction between 
personal and business transactions (PIC) 
3. Disregard for internal controls over misappropriation of 
assets or failing to correct known internal controls 
4. Changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may indicate 
assets have been misappropriated 
5. Behaviour indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with 
the entity or its treatment of the employee 
Key – PIC – Present in the research compiled by Cohen et al. (2010) 
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